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Abstract
Reserving political office for members of a particular, usually disadvantaged, group is a common form of
political quota in many parts of the world. This has been shown to improve distributional access in favour of
reserved groups, but often conjectured (and shown) to come at the cost of governance quality. We develop the
first theoretical model to demonstrate the opposite possibility; a reduction in political competition - due to office
being restricted to members of a pre-designated group - can improve governance. The model establishes a tight
set of predictions regarding when improvements should be expected to occur, and when not. Such predictions
are not yielded by alternative theories of political competition, are a priori unlikely to occur by chance, and have
never been investigated in the large empirical literature on the effects of political reservations. We first show, in a
Maharashtrian sample of rural villages, that governance outcomes dramatically increase under reservations. This
is the first such effect documented in the literature. We then demonstrate a non-uniform pattern of improvement
that lines up precisely with the predictions of the theory developed here.
∗Vancouver School of Economics, siwan.anderson@ubc.ca, patrick.francois@ubc.ca. The authors would like to thank our collaborators 
in the data collection for making this project feasible – Ashok Kotwal and Ashwini Kulkarni. In addition to their input, we have also 
benefited from discussions with Daron Acemoglu, James Fearon, Francesco Trebbi, Matilde Bombardini, Torsten Persson, Debraj Ray, 
E. Somanathan, Ernesto Dal Bo, Fabrizio Zilibotti, Oliver Vanden Eynden, Gaurav Datt and seminar participants at the Canadian 
Institute for Advanced Research (IOG), Aix-Marseilles School of Economics, Monash University, ISI Delhi, UBC, BREAD Stanford 
Meetings, Hong Kong University, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Yale, Kellogg School of Management, India-China 
Conference (University of Warwick), Identity Workshop (Monash University - Prato), and RIDGE/LACEA-PEG meetings.
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“Let us never forget that government is ourselves and not an alien power over us. The ultimate rulers
of our democracy are not a President and senators and congressmen and government officials, but the
voters of this country.”
Franklin D. Roosevelt
1 Introduction
As this quote suggests, a major advantage, and what many see as THE point of democracy, is that citizens
choose their leaders. Candidates who stand before voters to ask for that mandate must defend their records, and
plans for the future, against rivals competing for their jobs. If this process of political competition works well, it
should align the career interests of political leaders with the policy interests of voters. Though shortcomings, in
practice, can lead the actions of elected leaders to diverge from the interests of their populace, it remains agreed
that competition for office, adjudicated by citizens, is the hallmark of the democratic process.1 Yet despite the
universally agreed upon necessity of political competition, many polities have implemented rules that would reduce
it. Reservations that restrict the set of candidates who can stand for office are one such rule.2 Typically, this is
intended to address the problem that traditionally disadvantaged individuals may face barriers to participation in
the political process, either as candidates or in some cases as voters, that limit their representation amongst the
elected, and/or their impact on the policy making process.
So, there is seen to be a tradeoff. Fairness and distributional concerns favour political reservations, but by
reducing competition, reservations could damage both political competence and governance quality. In the present
paper, we develop a theory that shows, under some conditions, there is no tradeoff. It is possible for reserved groups
to be both distributionally advantaged, and for overall governance quality to increase.
We will explore our theory in India, a country where political reservations have long been part of the political
landscape. There, political reservations have been successful in redistributing public goods towards reserved groups3,
1The literature has explored a number of ways that divergence between the interests of citizens and their representatives may arise,
for example: if leaders care about policies directly, and there is less than full commitment – Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and
Coate (1997), if votes can be bought – Finan and Schechter (2012), if the franchise is restricted – Llavador and Oxoby (2005), to name
a few. But these features notwithstanding, the ideal of democratic competition remains a sound one.
2At latest count, at least half of the countries in the world use some type of electoral quota based on gender (see
https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas) and at least twenty eight countries implement minimal quotas for ethnic groups,
see Bird (2014). This includes all states of India, the world’s largest democracy.
3In India, positive effects on the receipt of targeted benefits have been found for reserved groups in Besley, Pande and Rao (2008).
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) find that reserved women leaders seem to spend more on projects that are relatively highly prioritized
by female village members. Bardhan, Mookherjee and Torrado (2010) find easier access to credit results after a group-based reservation
to SC/ST. Pande (2003) finds benefits at the state legislature representative level, though this is not the level of governance we study.
It should be noted that not all studies find effects. Dunning and Nilekani (2013), for example, find small (zero) distributive effects of
political reservations in Karnataka, Rajasthan and Bihar. The authors conjecture that the saliency of political parties is essential for
providing resources in the clientelist structures found in rural India which may undo direct effects. Chin and Prakash (2011) find mixed
effects on poverty for reserved seats in state assemblies. Jensensius (2015) finds very weak long term effects for SCs and Bhavnani (2016)
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but the anticipated quality tradeoff, via a number of mechanisms, has been thought to occur.4 The theory we develop
alternatively predicts positive effects on governance quality. Since this is surprising and goes in an opposite direction
to much of the literature, we first elaborate the intuition for it here, before developing the formalization in the body
of the paper, and extracting the predictions more rigorously.
The reasoning follows from the logic of the “Politics-of-Fear”, which has been elegantly elaborated by Padro-i-
Miquel (2007). Politics-of-fear applies in divided societies – i.e., those where politics is organized along identity lines,
and where the distribution of benefits to groups organized along such lines is of paramount interest to constituents.
As Padro-i-Miquel (2007) shows, in such settings a group’s existing representative enjoys a type of “incumbency
advantage” vis-a-vis a challenger from within the group. If the group’s hold on power is more likely to persist when
their current leader re-contests for power, the leader gets a kleptocratic rent. The leader can be venal, corrupt
and/or lazy and still receive the group’s support (up to a point), because replacing him or her increases the chances
that another group will seize the leadership position. So the leader can openly exert less than first best levels of
effort, and be widely believed to continue to do so, yet still receive the support of group members because they fear
that without him they will lose hold on the leadership. With all groups subject to similar internal concerns, the
fear of another group coming to power is heightened since they too will be represented by a venal or corrupt leader.
The equilibrium ends up featuring poor leaders ascending to power no matter which group they represent.
Political reservations break this equilibrium by loosening the lock on group level support held by incumbents.5
Reservations, by ensuring for the group that one of their own will hold the leader’s position no matter what, allow
contests from within the group to be entertained without fear of losing power to another group. The reserved group
can either replace their leader with a new representative who promises to do better, or extract a commitment from
their leader to do so (if short-term commitments are possible). When this happens, we expect to see an increase in
finds no positive representation effect of SC quotas after the quota expires. However, Beaman et. al (2009) showed that by exposing
constituents to women leaders, negative stereotypes biased against women as leaders could be partially reversed.
4One effect arises from restricting voter choice to a limited set of candidates. Auerbach and Zeigfeld (2016) find that quotas reduced
electoral competition in Indian contexts – villages and higher levels – with fewer candidates contesting. Mitra (2018) develops a
theoretical model, and provides support for considering heterogeneous effects of mandated political representation. The elites of such
groups may benefit more than the rank-and-file, who may actually be made worse off. Another effect arises because reservations displace
career politicians and hence introduce leaders likely to be inexperienced, poorer, and hence less well educated. Decision making and
effectiveness may be compromised. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) found that caste based reservations in West Bengal did indeed
lead to less educated, poorer and less politically-experienced Pradhans. Though notably without adverse effects on governance there.
Lamba and Spears (2013) find that villages with reserved Pradhans are less likely to win a “clean” village award. This seems relatively
unimportant, but may indicate deeper problems that are not reflected in official data. Gajwani and Zhang (2015) found negative effects
of reserved female village leaders on the building of schools and roads, with supporting evidence suggesting it was due to their poorer
connections with higher level officials, and systemic knowledge. Reservations also create the possibility of “lame duck” incumbents,
unable to stand for re-election after reservations are announced – typically two to three months before elections in our villages. Though
reservations do not systematically rotate across election cycles in Maharashtra, a reserved leader from a very small caste group in a
village is unlikely to be re-elected in an open contest, so there is also the very real likelihood that many reserved leaders will become
lame-ducks when themselves in office. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) found no effect of lame-duck incumbency in their sample. But
this is at least in part due to the fact that such incumbents did not seem to understand that they could not stand again. One imagines
this lack of understanding to abate through time.
5Or similarly by a group’s traditional representative who may not currently be in power, if this is also a source of competitive
advantage over within group rivals – an extension of the basic model demonstrates this in what follows.
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overall governance quality in addition to the usual distributional benefits towards the reserved group.
But the circumstances under which governance improves according to the theory are special, and so restrict
where we should look. Though reservations reduce political competition across groups – members of some groups
are excluded from leadership – they may actually serve to increase competition for leadership positions from within
groups, thereby improving electoral discipline on leaders. So, according to the theory, improvements can happen
only when reservations are allocated to groups who usually organize politically anyway.
As noted already, India has long practiced reservations, and it has done so at multiple levels of government
and for multiple different groups. One of India’s largest states (Maharshtra) provides an opportunity to test the
theory’s predictions at the most local level —- the principal leadership position (Pradhan) of village governments
(Gram Panchayats). Two distinct types of reservation operate there. One is for gender – a third of all leadership
positions are reserved for women6, and allocated randomly via the electoral commission. A second is for traditionally
disadvantaged groups (lower castes), also allocated via a randomization process.7 Since political organization is
not, to our knowledge (nor in our Maharashtrian sample), ever organized around gender, gender based reservations
can not positively affect governance according to our theory.
However, village leadership contests are organized around caste groupings. This is, in fact, the typical form
of electoral alignment in Indian village politics. Consequently caste based reservations are where the theory first
predicts such improvements could occur. But there are further restrictions. If a group is so small that it has almost
no capacity to retain the leadership, even were it to retain its incumbent, then the leader has little incumbency
advantage to start with. Reservations should have little effect here. However, as the group increases relative
size, so too does the incumbency advantage of its leader, and his/her kleptocratic rent. These are dissipated via
the contested leadership race that occurs when the group has the safety of reservations – so governance should
measurably improve under reservations. But a group that is larger still, so large as to be essentially guaranteed
leadership even absent reservations, will not experience a change in governance upon receiving a reservation. A
group so large that it never fears losing the leadership position in an open contest will not have a leader enjoying
kleptocratic rents in the first place because he can be replaced without the group fearing loss. In such cases,
reservations again change nothing. Since the effects of group size on kleptocratic rents are non-monotonic, so too
are the effects of reservations, and we will see that this is a distinct prediction of the theory developed here vis-a-
vis alternative theories that have been proposed and could be applied to model the effects of reservations in such
settings.
The main implication tested is the one described in the paragraph above; the non-monotonic pattern of gov-
6Most recently, the state of Maharahstra increased this proportion to 50%. At the time of our data collection it was still at 33%.
7In Maharashtra this involves reservations for Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SC and STs) which are allocated randomly to villages
at a frequency reflecting state population levels, and to “Other Backward Castes” (OBCs) for whom the leadership position in a village
Panchayat is randomly reserved in 27% of villages statewide at each election.
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ernance improvements in village leader group size when leadership is reserved.8 The model additionally predicts
two other factors that should impact the size of governance improvements under reservations. The first is the
importance to the group of holding the leadership position, and the second is the magnitude of kleptocratic rents
enjoyed by leaders from other (non-reserved) groups. Our theory predicts that both of these factors, which we will
proxy with observables, should interact positively with the effects of reservation on governance outcomes.
All three of these theoretical implications are unique to the theory here. They are neither immediate, nor
obviously likely for extraneous reasons, nor have they been examined before. This makes investigation of these
implications a good test of this theory.
To undertake such scrutiny we use data collected across a sample of villages in the state of Maharashtra, India.
Since 1993, Gram Panchayats in Maharashtra have been responsible for program implementation, local public good
provision, implementation of pro-poor policies, and subject to a regular electoral process. Reservation quotas for the
Pradhan position have been randomly applied and scrupulously implemented throughout the state by its electoral
commission. We collected data on several key governance outcomes relating directly to program provision and
finances.
We find a pattern of effects due to reservations that are remarkably consistent with the predictions generated
by the theory. Reservations applied to both small and large groups yield no improvement in quality of governance
by any of the measures listed above, relative to the governance in villages with unreserved leaders drawn from the
same sized group. However, when a group is middling in size (measured in numerous ways), holding the leader’s
position via a reservation coincides with a marked improvement in governance outcomes on all dimensions, relative
to a similar sized group winning the leadership position after an open election. Additionally, in villages where
holding the leadership position is more valued, or where non-reserved groups are more likely to enjoy kleptocratic
rents, reservations have larger positive effects on governance; again as the model predicts.
Improved governance quality under reservations generates an accompanying pattern of data consistent with
our theory that reservations are weakening politics-of-fear type interactions in villages. This would also explain
why reservations that have been studied in other Indian states have not found similar positive effects. In most of
these studies, the groups to which reservations apply rarely fall in to the “middling” size category that our theory
identifies as important for showing positive effects. In most states, reservations are limited to Scheduled Castes or
8Our focus on the politics-of-fear underpinning for misgovernance does not preclude any of the other well known, and well studied,
reasons that could explain misgovernance in this context. It may well be that the divisions that arise from ethnic or caste based tensions
themselves directly affect good governance (see survey in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)) or that weak institutions heighten collective
action problems making it more difficult to ensure political accountability (as in Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2004)). It may
also be that lack of commitment locks polities into inefficiencies (as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2001)), perhaps even in the form of
clientelism, as modeled in Robinson and Verdier (2013). Indeed, we have argued earlier that clientelism is important in the Indian
villages of our sample – see Anderson et. al. (2015). These, and other mechanism could all be part of the backdrop to the effect that
we study. While recognizing this, we ignore these (and other) factors in our modeling here because, as will be seen, the pattern of
correlations in misgovernance, and how these interact with political reservations generated by the politics-of-fear problems are extremely
peculiar, and would not arise from these other explanations.
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Scheduled Tribes who typically make up a small proportion of a village population, and whose chances of holding
power without a reservation are close to zero.9 A significant aspect of Maharashtra’s OBCs (Other Backward
Castes) reservations, as will be seen, is that such groups are quite often a significant contesting political power
even without reservations. As the paper’s theoretical section demonstrates, this is key to finding positive effects of
reservations on governance if politics-of-fear factors are at play.
In our discussion of relevant literature we will argue that existing models generally would not predict any
improvements from reservations. For the few that do, there is never a non-monotonic pattern that could explain the
observed patterns in our data. We attempt to construct extensions of existing frameworks that would do so, but
these are awkward. And this, coupled with the fact that the politics-of-fear ingredients of strong group (jati) level
identification, and the organization of political support around such identification, are present in rural Maharashtra,
together with the empirical support for the additional model predictions, makes us conclude that reservations seem
to be improving governance because they are favourably undermining politics-of-fear type equilibria. We discuss
possible implications of this outside our context in the conclusions.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 develops a model that generates empirical predictions for when reser-
vations will affect governance. Section 3 discusses plausible alternative explanations for the observed patterns in
the data using other theoretical frameworks. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 tests the predictions of the
model. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Preliminaries
In rural Maharahstra, as in much of India, the relevant organizing group for village politics is the jati or sub-
caste. We will thus use the terms “political group”, “jati” and “sub-caste” interchangeably here, and it will be used
analogously to “ethnic group” as in the model of Padro-i-Miquel (2007).10
Reservations applied to the Pradhan (i.e. the elected leader of the village government) are the most consequential
in our village context. In Maharashtra, the Pradhan is the only paid member of the Panchayat (village government),
he or she wields considerable influence and autonomy, and villagers in our surveys typically reported the Pradhans
to be the de facto, as well as the de jure, village leaders. Our model is geared around the effects of reservations on
9An exception is in some tribal villages, where almost all members are part of a scheduled tribe, and hence outside the formal caste
hierarchy. Again, here our theory predicts no effects of reservations. There are also reservations for women, who are of course not
proportionately small subsets of the population. But, as mentioned above, since individuals do not organize politically by gender in
Indian villages, politics-of-fear reasoning does not predict similar positive governance effects in the case of gender reservations. The
non-effect of gender reservations on quality is also borne out in our data.
10This requires particular attention in the empirical estimation as reservations are allocated at a broad caste grouping level that
contains many sub-castes. We discuss this fully in Section 4 of the paper.
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Pradhan actions and hence village outcomes. To that end, we collect numerous measures that could potentially be
affected by reservations. These can be broken up into two broad categories: One set of measures represent intra-
group distributional effects of reservations. 11 A second set of measures reflect the overall level of governance quality
in the villages. The key governance outcome variables that we use, in line with Anderson, Francois, Kotwal (2015),
are described in Section 4. The present section constructs a model inspired by Padro-i-Miquel’s (2007) politics-of-
fear framework, but extended to explore the effects that reservations of political office have on governance outcomes.
We first elaborate on features of the Maharashtrian context that inform our modeling choices.
2.1.1 Maharashtrian context
Some elements of the relatively formalized Maharashtrian village setting, which is electoral, lead us to depart
from the modelling choices made in Padro-i-Miquel’s (2007) canonical politics-of-fear setting which imagines a more
weakly formalized political setting. First, almost all funds utilized by village governments are in the form of transfers
from higher levels of government – with almost no direct capacity to raise revenue via taxes on constituents within
the village. This limits a leader’s predation. However targetting of expenditures is possible, as jatis (sub-caste
groups) tend to live in neighbourhoods that are geographically distinct. The allocation of discretionary spending
across groups in our villages – for example, the construction and maintenance of local public goods, is a key
form of group based discretionary advantage. Additionally, the Pradhan can facilitate own group member access to
targeted federal and state benefits. We thus model leader discretion over the allocation of benefits towards members
of groups.
A leader’s morally hazardous behavior also takes a different form here. Since rapacious behavior in the form
of taxing and extraction is not an option for leaders here, leader moral hazard is more likely to involve shirking.
The most prevalent form of this is insufficient effort devoted to securing village resource allocations from higher
levels of government, and consequently fewer poverty-reduction programs entering the village. There is a consistent
perception on the part of villagers that such programs are inadequately available. On average, less than half of the
externally mandated and funded poverty alleviation programs are available in villages, there is little effort expended
by leaders to obtain funds via meeting with higher level officials, and few meetings with villagers themselves. There
is also low program participation when programs are in place, suggesting limited availability.12 So we model leader
morally hazardous behavior as shirking on the effort required to obtain benefits for constituents in the form of
services, grants, programs and public goods to which the village is entitled.
A crucial component of the politics-of-fear is that ruler replacement, due to loss of own group support, increases
11For example, “Did having a Pradhan reserved to be from your own caste group (jati) affect the allocation of resources to your group
vis-a-vis the others?” As in most other studies of reservations, Table A5 in the Appendix confirms that individuals do indeed report
benefiting disproportionately if their own jati member is the Pradhan.
12For a more complete discussion of governance failures in this setting see Anderson, Francois, and Kotwal (2015) and Anderson,
Francois, Kotwal and Kulkarni (2015).
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the likelihood of a switch in power between groups. Additionally Padro-i-Miquel’s framework assumes that loss of
support precipitates a governance breakdown. In Maharashtra, even were a group to retract support for their own
Pradhan, he or she would still remain in office until the next election, after which a successor would be formally
appointed. However, a group’s replacing an incumbent does plausibly reduce the chances the replacement candidate
wins office; so we persist with that assumption. And we further assume, as happens in reality, that deposed leaders
return back to being citizens of the village and remain members of the same group after office.
Finally, there is a slight difference in timing within our model, again reflecting the more formalized context of
governance here. Padro-i-Miquel imagines a leader already in place, committing to his current policies, and then
his group deciding whether to support him and receive the policies promised, or not support him, with a type
of chaos and governance breaking down ensuing. Our Maharashtrian village setting, in contrast, is electoral. In
a forthcoming election, the incumbent can commit to his group members the effort he will implement, and their
distributional benefits, if returned to office. Against the incumbent are potential challengers who have identical
commitment power with their own group members; so we assume all groups are equal in their freedom to choose a
leader to contest elections, and in the commitment capacity those leaders can provide them.13 The only asymmetries
that arise are those generated by the political reservation process itself. Political reservations are announced well
in advance of elections, so some groups, by fiat, will simply not be able to field a candidate in such cases.
2.2 Model details
Time is discrete and each period represents a term of office. Consider a single village which is divided into two
groups (jatis) – denoted A and B, and each group decides on a leader who will contest elections for office. In every
period, if the incumbent is from group A, and if this incumbent receives the “support” of his group, st = 1, he is
re-elected with probability γA. The group may instead coalesce behind a challenger candidate who is voluntarily
drawn from the group.14 Doing this weakly increases the likelihood of a switch of power to the other group. If the
incumbent is “not supported”, st = 0, the group’s challenger candidate wins the election with probability γ
a ≤ γA.
The leader receives per period “office rents” measured as pi in the utility metric. In office, the ruler can choose
to allocate a component of spending/resources or services in a way that can be targeted to a single caste/jati group.
We denote this as being valued at η per group member in each village. Thus a member of group i in receipt of such
distributional benefits from the leader receives η in utility metric, a member of group j 6= i receives 0.15
Leader effort determines the quality of village governance, and governance is a public good. Governance is
13The consequences of relaxing the commitment assumption are discussed after the main results.
14As in Padro-i-Miquel (2007) we assume coordination within the group over the support decision. Each member is small, but all act
in the collective best interest of the group when deciding on the support decision. As in his framework, without such coordination the
chances of, and benefits to, the leader from kleptocratic rule are even greater than will be established in equilibrium.
15This shuts down the richer part of Padro-i-Miquel’s (2007) model concerning taxation and group specific activities, but allows us
to focus on competition over the public good aspects of leadership, which our data addresses.
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personally costly; two units of effort are required to produce a single unit of public good. All utility functions are
linear. The leader thus incurs total disutility of minus G when producing G units of public good, and all other
citizens experience a benefit of G. A leader producing G = pi/2 level of governance effort has the same per period
utility from being in office as a citizen (modulo distributional benefits being equivalent). This will be a useful
benchmark in what follows.
Leaders can commit to their constituents the level of effort they will devote to public good creation if elected.16
Commitments hold for the term of office; thus a promise made by a candidate in an election held at t− 1 for office
at t, holds for the term t. If the leader stands for re-election at t, they can promise policy that will hold for t + 1
if reelected, but cannot promise anything into future terms beyond that.17 They cannot commit today to what
they will promise in some future election beyond the upcoming one. Thus, at time t, GIt is the level of governance
quality promised by the time t leader when he was standing for office at time t− 1, for I = A,B, or in a reserved
election: I = R.
Any citizen can challenge an incumbent at any election, and the challenger has the same commitment power the
leader has. If the challenger is selected by the group over the incumbent, st = 0, the challenger contests the election
and the previous leader reverts back to becoming a citizen. Let 1 − δ denote the probability of death (which also
acts as discounting).18
2.2.1 Reservations
With probability p a reservation occurs for the Pradhan position in a village for the upcoming election. This
is drawn independently across time and villages. Assume that reservations can only go to group A.19 Denote a
reserved election at time t by RESt = 1. With reciprocal probability, 1− p, the village is not reserved; RESt = 0.
Reservations are known before the election, also in advance of when candidates commit to policies, and in advance
of when groups decide on their representative.
2.2.2 States and Transitions
The leader at time t decides GIt+1, the level of governance to run on if re-elected to office. The level of Gt he is
producing now is the level he promised when he ran for office in period t − 1. For notational simplicity, and due
16They can also commit to distributional transfers to their constituents, but since promised transfers always line up with ex post
transfer incentives, there is no need for this commitment.
17We describe what would happen with infinite commitment, or no commitment later.
18If a leader elected at the time t election for office at t+ 1 dies in the interim, we assume that he is replaced by a randomly selected
member of his own group who undertakes to provide the level of governance that the leader promised in his campaign. Groups are large
so that the probability of any one individual being randomly selected is assumed to be negligible.
19Group B do not receive reservations. As in reality, there is always at least one “group” who do not receive reservations. In India it
would be upper castes.
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to the symmetry of agents in the model, we distinguish only between promises made by incumbents from a group,
GIt+1, and challengers to an incumbent G
IC
t+1.
The world is in one of three states: St ∈ {A,B,R} referring to the current incumbent’s leadership position and
how it was arrived at. Respectively, the state is one in which either the leadership position is held by an A after
an unreserved election, a B after an unreserved election, or an A from a reserved election (state R). The leader’s
group’s strategy is denoted σI . The choice is binary, the group either decides st = 1 or st = 0, after seeing the
leader’s promised GI and that of any challengers, GIC .
The probability of the leader’s group winning again is γI if st = 1, and probability γ
i ≤ γI if st = 0 and
he is replaced by a challenger; with I = A or B, and i = a or b. Let T (σI , S,RES) denote the state transition
function. Its arguments are the support choice of the group in power, σI , the state, and the reservation status
of the upcoming election, respectively. For example with the group choosing to “support” an A leader in an
unreserved election, T (1, A, 0) = γA, and without support the function is T (0, A, 0) = γa. If the state is reserved
then T (1, A, 1) = T (0, A, 1) = 1.
2.2.3 Timing
Timing within a period, t, is as follows.
0. The state is determined by the outcome of the election/reservation draw that was held the previous period:
St ∈ {A,B,R}. Nature then draws RESt = 1 with probability p and RESt = 0 with reciprocal probability.
1. The incumbent leader chooses the level of governance to campaign on. If St = A, or R, the A incumbent
chooses the Gt+1 that he will produce if re-elected. If St = B and RESt = 0, the B leader announces his Gt+1. If
St = B and RESt = 1, a B leader cannot run again.
2. Citizens choose whether to stand to represent their group as a challenger. If RESt = 1 then only an A can
stand and propose a policy Gt+1. If RESt = 0 then any A or B citizen can stand and propose a Gt+1.
3. If St = A then the A group members decide whether to support, st = 1, the incumbent or not, st = 0, after
observing the incumbent’s promise and that of a challenger from the A group. If St = B and RESt = 0, then
B group members decide whether to support their incumbent or not, again after observing their incumbent and
challengers’ promised governance levels. If St = B and RESt = 1, the B group does not have a support decision.
4. If RESt = 0, the incumbent is returned to office with probability γ
I under st = 1, and probability γ
i ≤ γI if
st = 0; with I = A or B, and i = a or b. If RESt = 1, then the member of group A that is supported by the group
ascends to the leadership with probability 1.
5. The winner of the election at t becomes the incumbent at t+ 1 and undertakes the Gt+1 promised at t.
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2.2.4 Markov Strategies
We solve for stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) of the game. The incumbent leader moves first after
observing the state, and after nature draws reservations. The leader’s strategy maps from the pair (St, RESt) to a
policy level Gt+1 ≥ 0. Note again that RESt refers to reservations drawn by nature in period t that will apply to the
subsequent election, t+ 1. For notational simplicity, denote an incumbent leader of type I ′s choice GIt+1, I = A,B,
when RESt = 0. When RESt = 1, only incumbent A leaders can stand again. Denote their choice in that case by
GRt+1.
The challenger’s strategy maps from the state, nature’s reservation draw, and the incumbent leader’s choice
of promised governance, (St, RESt, G
I
t+1) to the challenger’s promised level of governance G
IC
t+1. The strategy
of group I is denoted σI and its arguments are the state, nature’s reservation draw, their leader’s announced
policy promise, and the policy proposals of challengers. These map to a support decision. Formally for group I:
σI
(
St, RESt, G
I
t+1, G
IC
t+1
)→ st ∈ {0, 1}.
Leader Value Functions
Let V At,L(A) denote the value function for an A leader in period t if the state is unreserved and V
A
t,L(R), if
reserved. The notation in the bracket refers to the state applying when the leader was elected, not the draw of
nature that will apply to the election they are about to contest. By the time an incumbent leader makes his policy
decision for the upcoming election, the reservation status applying to that election will be realized, i.e., nature will
play. For an A incumbent holding power from a previously unreserved election, the value function is computed
under the optimal choices conditional upon nature’s play in the period. We will impose stationarity in what follows,
but for now we explicitly note the time dependence in the value functions and the G choices by preserving the t
notation. So, for a current A leader who won election without reservation, his level of governance is GAt . He will
choose his GAt+1 promise if his position ends up not being reserved after nature’s play, or he will decide his G
R
t+1 if
it is reserved. That is:
V At,L(A) = pi −GAt + η + δ
[
(1− p) max
GAt+1
{
σA.
(
T (1, A, 0)V At+1,L(A) + T (1, B, 0)V
A
t+1(B)
)
+
(
1− σA) . (T (0, A, 0) (GACt+1 −GAt+1 + V At+1(A))+ T (0, B, 0)V At+1(B))}
+pmax
GRt+1
{
σA.
(
V At+1,L(R)
)
+
(
1− σA) . (GRCt+1 −GRt+1 + V At+1(R))}
]
. (1)
Note that the leader’s choices anticipate the support decision of his group, σA
(
St, RESt, G
A
t+1, G
AC
t+1, G
B
t+1, S
)
, which
will have to be consistent as an equilibrium requirement (below). Note also that we have omitted the arguments of σ
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above and in what follows. If he is not supported by his group
(
1− σA), he will revert to being a citizen, where his
utility is evaluated using a citizen’s value function. The value functions for citizens, V At+1(I), where I = A,B,R, are
defined below, and therefore play an important role in leaders’ decisions, in contrast with Padro-i-Miquel (2007). As
discussed earlier, unlike the setting he studied, in the villages of our sample, whether an incumbent is supported in
the upcoming election, or not, governments continue to function. A leader not supported, though not able to return
as Pradhan, still remains in the village and remains a member of the same group. As an equilibrium requirement,
GAt+1 must be a best response to the level of governance promised by challengers from his own group, G
AC
t+1, and
from the other group, GBt+1.
Similarly for a B leader:
V Bt,L(B) = pi −GBt + η + δ
[
(1− p) max
GBt+1
{
σB .
(
T (1, B, 0)V Bt+1,L(B) + T (1, A, 0)V
B
t+1(A)
)
+
(
1− σB) (T (0, B, 0) (GBCt+1 −GBt+1V Bt+1(B))+ T (0, A, 0)V Bt+1(A))}+ pV Bt+1(R)
]
. (2)
Finally, an A leader elected in a village where reservations applied, i.e., under which he was elected in a reserved
contest, has a value function: V At,L(R):
V At,L(R) = pi −GRt + η + δ
[
(1− p) max
GAt+1
{
σA.
(
T (1, A, 0)V At+1,L(A) + T (1, B, 0)V
A
t+1(B)
)
+
(
1− σA) (T (0, A, 0) (GACt+1 −GAt+1 + V At+1(A))+ T (0, B, 0)V At+1(B)}
+pmax
GRt+1
{
σA.
(
V At+1,L(R)
)
+
(
1− σA) (GRCt+1 −GRt+1 + V At+1(R))}
]
. (3)
And clearly a B leader cannot be in power in a village that was subject to reservation, i.e., V Bt,L(R) can never arise.
Citizen Value Functions
The value function for a citizen who is in group A depends on both whether his own group holds the leadership,
which is necessary for a support decision for A to be relevant, and whether the village election was reserved. This
depends on the group’s optimal support decision, σA, determined after reservations are drawn for the subsequent
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election, and both the incumbent and challengers have stated their policy positions for it. So the value function:
V At (A) = G
A
t +η+δ
[
(1−p) max
σA
{
σA.
(
T (1, A, 0)V At+1(A) + T (1, B, 0)V
A
t+1(B)
)
+
(
1− σA) (T (0, A, 0) (GACt+1 −GAt+1 + V At+1(A))+ T (0, B, 0)V At+1(B))}
+ pmax
σA
{
σA.
(
V At+1(R)
)
+
(
1− σA) (GRCt+1 −GRt+1 + V At+1(A))}
]
. (4)
Note that in the second maximization above, T () = 1 since, in the event of a reservation, the A group’s representative
is necessarily elected. Similarly for an A citizen when a B is in power:
V At (B) = G
B
t + δ
[
(1− p) (σB . (T (1, B, 0)V At+1(B) + T (1, A, 0)V At+1(A))
+
(
1− σB) (T (0, B, 0) (GBCt+1 −GBt+1 + δV At+1(B))+ T (0, A, 0)V At+1(A)))+ pV At+1(R)
]
.
Note that, in this case, there are no choices for the A group since they do not have incumbency in the next election.
Reciprocally when an A is in power, B citizens have no upcoming choices and obtain:
V Bt (A) = G
A
t + δ
[
(1− p) (σA. (T (1, A, 0)V Bt+1(A) + T (1, B, 0)V Bt+1(B))
+
(
1− σA) (T (0, A, 0) (GACt+1 −GAt + V Bt+1(A))+ T (0, B, 0)V Bt+1(B)))+ pV Bt+1(R)
]
.
Similarly, for a B citizen when the B group holds power we have:
V Bt (B) = G
B
t + η + δ
[
(1− p) max
σB
{
σB .
(
T (1, B, 0)V Bt+1(B) + T (1, A, 0)V
B
t+1(A)
)
+
(
1− σB) (T (0, B, 0) (GBCt+1 −GBt+1 + V Bt+1(B))+ T (0, A, 0)V Bt+1(A))}+ pV Bt+1(R)
]
. (5)
We finally define V Bt (R) and V
A
t (R), the value functions pertaining to citizens in already reserved villages. These
are the same as for citizens in an A controlled village except for the current period governance, GRt which need not,
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and generally will not, equal GAt .
V At (R) = G
R
t +η+δ
[
(1−p) max
σA
{
σA.
(
T (1, A, 0)V At+1(A) + T (1, B, 0)V
A
t+1(B)
)
+
(
1− σA) (T (0, A, 0) (GACt+1 −GAt+1 + V At+1(A))+ T (0, B, 0)V A(B))}
+ pmax
σA
{
σA.
(
V At+1(R)
)
+
(
1− σA) (GRCt+1 −GRt+1 + V At+1(A))}
]
. (6)
V Bt (R) = G
R
t + δ
[
(1− p) (σA. (T (1, A, 0)V Bt+1(A) + T (1, B, 0)V Bt+1(B))
+
(
1− σA) (T (0, A, 0) (GACt+1 −GAt+1 + V Bt+1(A))+ T (0, B, 0)V Bt+1(B)))+ pV Bt+1(R)
]
.
Challenger Value Functions
An A challenger in a village that is unreserved for the upcoming election in t+ 1 chooses GACt+1 to maximize:
V At+1,C(A) = max
GACt+1
{
σA.
(
T (1, A, 0)V At+1(A) + T (1, B, 0)V
A
t+1(B)
)
+
(
1− σA) (T (0, A, 0) (GAt+1 −GACt+1 + V At+1,L(A))+ T (0, B, 0) (V At+1(B)))} . (7)
In a village that is reserved in the next election he chooses GRCt+1:
V At+1,C(R) = max
GRCt+1
{
σAV At+1(A) +
(
1− σA) (GAt+1 −GRCt+1 + V At+1,L(A))} . (8)
Similarly for a B challenger in the situation when the subsequent election is not reserved (i.e., the only case in
which his group can field a candidate):
V Bt+1,C(B) = max
GBCt+1
{
σB .
(
T (1, B, 0)V Bt+1(B) + T (1, A, 0)V
B
t+1(A)
)
+
(
1− σB) (T (0, B, 0) (GBt+1 −GBCt+1 + V Bt+1,L(B))+ T (0, A, 0) (V Bt+1(A))) .} (9)
Value functions for challengers are undefined if the group does not hold the leadership; i.e. V Bt+1,C(A) and V
A
t+1,C(B)
are not defined. In a model extension that we consider in section 7.9, we also define incumbency advantages for
representatives who are presently not in office, but are the group’s usual leader. Under such an extension these
latter two value functions would also be defined, but for simplicity we do not consider that case any further; as will
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be seen it generates no additional predictions that can be analyzed with existing data.
2.2.5 Value Functions in Equilibrium
A stationary pure strategy MPE for this game is a combination of strategies,
(
GA∗, GR∗, GB∗, σA∗, σB∗, GAC∗, GBC∗, GRC∗
)
where GA∗, GR∗ solve (1) and (3), GB∗ solves (2), σA∗ solves (4), σB∗ solves (5), GAC∗ solves (7), GBC∗ solves (9),
and GRC∗ solves (8).
2.2.6 Challenger entry
Deposing an incumbent is costly to citizens since a non-incumbent is more likely to cede leadership to the other
group. So a challenger must offer improved governance vis a vis an incumbent to be considered. That is, a challenger
must offer GACt+1 such that for an A group :
γa
(
GAC∗t+1 + η + δ
(
pV At+2(R) + (1− p)(γAV At+2(A) + (1− γA)V At+2(B)
))
(10)
+ (1− γa)V At+1(B) ≥ γAV At+1(A) + (1− γA)V At+1(B).
Note that in the above, and subsequent specifications of the models’ conditions, we substitute from section 2.2.2
the corresponding values of γ that apply for the T () function. Similarly GBC for a B group:
γb
(
GBC∗t+1 + η + δ
(
pV Bt+2(R) + (1− p)(γBV Bt+2(B) + (1− γB)V Bt+2(A)
))
(11)
+
(
1− γb)V Bt+1(A) ≥ γBV Bt+1(B) + (1− γB)V Bt+1(A).
In each case, the probability of the group winning the leadership is weakly lower under the challenger: for an A,
due to γa ≤ γA. The term γA− γa thus corresponds with what Padro-i-Miquel (2007) connotes as due to “personal
rule”; the increased stability of the group’s rule due to maintaining the incumbent.20
Next, consider the entry condition from a challenger’s perspective. For a challenger to be willing to offer a
GACt+1, or G
BC
t+1, he must weakly prefer being a leader producing the respective amount to remaining a citizen. In
doing this, he internalizes the fact that by deposing an incumbent he will lower the group’s overall probability of
gaining the leadership position, and thus jeopardize his own consumption of η. For such a challenger to enter in an
20Note that in Padro-i-Miquel (2007) a challenger’s incentives to enter are never explicitly considered. This is because he assumes
that, in the event a leader is deposed, all individuals in the group receive payoffs of zero for a period. Individuals, as citizens, thus
(weakly) prefer supporting a leader over not-supporting one. Here, in contrast, a leader’s promised level of governance is compared to
the best that is offered from a challenger in the group were he to win. This is true to the context of villages in India. Challenger’s must
thus also (weakly) prefer to not enter at any promised level of governance at which they would be (weakly) preferred by their group.
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unreserved election, necessarily:
γa
(
pi −GAC∗t+1 + η + δ
(
pV At+2,L(R) + (1− p)
(
γAV At+2,L(A) + (1− γA)V At+2(B)
)))
(12)
+(1− γa)V At+1(B) ≥ γAV At+1(A) + (1− γA)V At+1(B)
γb
(
pi −GBC∗t+1 + η + δ
(
pV Bt+2(R) + (1− p)
(
γBV Bt+2,L(B) + (1− γB)V Bt+2(A)
)))
(13)
+(1− γb)V Bt+1(A) ≥ γBV Bt+1(B) + (1− γB)V Bt+1(A).
The left hand side of the expressions above are the value to the challenger when contesting for the village leadership
position as the representative of group A or B respectively. In contrast, when the village is reserved, an A is assured
to win, so the A challenger’s condition is modified accordingly:
pi −GRC∗t+1 + η + δ
(
pV At+2,L(R) + (1− p)
(
γAV At+2,L(A) + (1− γA)V At+2(B)
)) ≥ V At+1(A). (14)
2.2.7 Solving the Model
A key effect of reservations is that necessarily GRC∗ = GR∗. To see this immediately, note that if the group
supports the incumbent they get: GRt+1+η+δ
(
pV At+2(R) + (1− p)(γAV At+2(A) + (1− γA)V At+2(B)
)
if not supporting
they get GRCt+1 + η + δ
(
pV At+2(R) + (1− p)(γAV At+2(A) + (1− γA)V At+2(B)
)
. So no MPE can feature a distinction
between the governance level offered by a challenger, and the level that would have to be produced by an incumbent
when reservations apply.
In contrast, within non-reserved villages, the incumbent’s advantage from personal rule (γA − γa) requires a
challenger to promise better governance in return for displacing the incumbent GAC∗ ≥ GA∗. Since incumbents
in non-reserved villages are strictly preferred to challengers offering the same level of governance, at any level of
governance for which a challenger is willing to take over the leadership from an incumbent, and at which he would be
preferred by his group, the leader will at least weakly prefer to remain leader for the same level of governance. This
implies that any MPE will feature incumbent leaders offering a level of governance in a non-reserved village that
is just sufficient to ensure that a challenger from his group is indifferent to entering under a promise of governance
at which his group is indifferent to supporting him. That is, σA∗ is such that the A group is indifferent between
obtaining GACt+1 + V
B
t+1(A) with probability γ
a and GAt+1 + V
B
t+1(A) with probability γ
A, and similarly for the σB∗
of the B group. So, GA∗, GB∗, GAC∗ and GBC∗ are such that (10), (11), (12) and (13) bind. The main existence
result showing that there is a unique fixed point solving the corresponding value functions is now proved.
Proposition 1. If the value of distributional benefits from leadership, η, is sufficiently great relative to the rents
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from office, pi, then there exists a stationary Markov Perfect Equilibrium which corresponds to the binding solutions
to equations (10) to (11) and (12) to (14) and the solutions to equations (24) to (32). This solution is unique.21
In such an equilibrium, incumbents are never deposed by challengers. Group members always prefer to vote
for their own representative over the leader of another group, and as in Padro-i-Miquel (2007), the existence of
personal rule ensures that incumbents enjoy kleptocratic rents. So provided that γA−γa > 0, the net present value
of being an incumbent leader strictly exceeds the net present value of being a citizen. An incumbent leader in that
situation sets GA∗ < pi/2, receiving utility strictly greater than any other member of the A group. Recall that the
indifference level of output would be GA = pi/2.
The reason why existence of such an equilibrium depends on the distributional benefits being sufficiently large
is that the persistence of group based voting depends on individuals valuing distributional benefits sufficiently more
than promised governance improvements. This is what rules out a deviation from a leader that would attract
out-group members by promising superior public good provision. A sufficient condition for this is simply that even
if the other group generates governance leaving its citizens indifferent to taking the leadership, i.e., G = pi2 , and a
citizen’s current leader provides zero governance, G = 0, this citizen will still prefer a leader from his own group.
The parametric sufficient condition is η ≥ pi2 . 22
We now compare the level of governance in a reserved village with that in a village returning an incumbent who
is not reserved. Since reservations only occur in A villages, the comparator is a non-reserved A leader.
Proposition 2. A reserved village has (weakly) improved governance compared to a non-reserved A village returning
an incumbent. That is:
GR∗ −GA∗ = η (γA − γa)ΘΦ ≥ 0,
where Θ,Φ > 0, and explicitly stated in the Appendix.
Governance improves under reservations because kleptocratic rents enjoyed by incumbents are destroyed when
leadership is guaranteed to the group. When that happens, group members can contest the leadership without the
group fearing that it will lose to the other group. Consequently, as the expression in the proposition shows, the
size of the improvement in governance is proportional to the size of “personal rule” γA − γa; which is the source of
kleptocratic rents. As the corollary below shows, the effects of reserving office are so great that entrants are willing
to offer levels of governance making citizens (statically) better off than the entrants themselves would be were they
to win office. That is:
21A sufficient condition is η ≥ pi
2
.
22The politics-of-fear arises precisely because inter-group distributional factors trump common governance goals. It is because of
this that any disciplining role of inter-group competition on leader public good delivery does not arise. Weaker conditions than in the
previous footnote could be established but are not of relevance for the theory or empirics, so we do not pursue them further.
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Corollary 1.
GR∗ >
pi
2
when γA − γa > 0.
Since the benchmark, first-best, level of governance at which a leader is indifferent to the leadership position is
G = pi/2, the corollary shows that the supported candidate under reservations is temporarily worse off than other
group members when becoming leader. However, the leader is only worse off in his first period (commitment period).
He is willing to do this because he is able to enjoy kleptocratic rents (probabilistically) from then on, and will receive
strictly higher flow utility than citizens while he remains in office. This makes clear the important role played by
the commitment technology assumed in the model. Commitments are made by candidates for the upcoming term
of office only. However, if they could commit to policies in to the infinite future, then candidates would never be
able to enjoy kleptocratic rents. Their electoral promises would entail commitments that bind them for all future
periods of office so that they could never exploit rents. With infinite commitments, then, the politics-of-fear problem
goes away. Relatedly, with no commitment power in the upcoming term, there is no possibility of a contest stage,
and no meaningful challenges to incumbents (at least in a Markov setting). All candidates would face the same
ex post incentives in policy formation, and incumbents would always be strictly preferred when there is personal
rule: γA − γa > 0. For cases in between these extremes, of which the current model is one, qualitatively similar
results apply to those that we established above. That is, leaders are able to exploit kleptocratic rents over the
non-commitment component of their terms in office. And reservations will destroy those rents, leading to a contest
that improves subsequent governance when they arrive at a village. So, the main prediction, that improvements in
governance arise from reservations, persist under all limited commitment extensions of the model.
We now turn to establishing a set of key characteristics of the equilibrium that will form the core of empirical
tests that will follow:
Proposition 3. (i) If γA−γa = 0, then reservations have no effect on village governance. That is: GR∗−GA∗ = 0.
(ii) If γA − γa > 0, then reservations have more impact on village governance, the greater is the own group
distributional benefit to holding the leadership, η. That is: GR∗ − GA∗ is increasing in η for γA − γa > 0. (iii) If
γA−γa > 0, then reservations have more impact on village governance, the greater is the other group’s incumbency
advantage, γB − γb. That is: GR∗ −GA∗ is increasing in γB − γb for γA − γa > 0.
Implication (i): incumbents in villages without personal rule, γA − γa = 0, do not enjoy kleptocratic rents.
Consequently, reserving political office in such villages does not affect governance outcomes. In contrast where
γA− γa > 0, reservations should have positive effects. This is immediate from the equation in Proposition 2, but is
important for explaining where we should see reservations working and where nothing should happen. Implication
(ii): In villages where such rents are present, γA − γa > 0, reservations’ effects on governance depend positively
on the value the group puts on maintaining its distributional benefits, η. Intuitively, where distributional benefits
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are highly valued, a leader’s kleptocratic rents are greatest, and the improvement in governance under reservations
(which destroy such rents) should be more pronounced. Implication (iii): In villages where such rents are present,
γA − γa > 0, reservations’ effects on governance depend positively on the magnitude of the other (non-reserved)
group’s leader’s kleptocratic rent over his group members, i.e. γB − γb. Intuitively, with large kleptocratic rents
for the other group’s leader (γB − γb large) the worse will be governance quality if the B group takes power. So
the more the A group values maintaining its current incumbent leader, and hence the larger is the kleptocratic rent
that the A leader can extract. So, once again reservation’s positive effects on governance will be more pronounced
when γB − γb is large.23
2.3 Empirical Predictions
We now discuss how we use the information on the proportion of the reserved group in a village to test the
implications of Proposition 3 and its dependence on γA − γa.24
Small groups: If a jati is such a small proportion of the village’s voters that it almost never wins the Pradhan’s
position, i.e., it only obtains the leadership via reservation, or through rare random events, then reservations should
have no impact on governance. That is, since γA → 0 , lowering re-election probabilities to γa < γA is not costly
to this group. Thus γA − γa → 0, and from the proposition there should be no impact of reservations on output.25
Large Groups: If a jati is so large a proportion of the village’s voters that it will almost always win elections in
non-reserved villages, then reserving a leadership position for this group will again have no impact on governance.
To see this, consider a group so powerful that even when an incumbent leader is deposed by a challenger from within
23We are indebted to comments from a previous anonymous reviewer of this paper who suggested that we explore the possibility
of such a “mutual fear multiplier” in our framework. His/her conjecture that since the multiplier is negative in Padro i Miquel’s
framework, by undoing it reservations should generate a positive multiplier effect, turns out to be true in the theory here. As that
reviewer conjectured, the positive governance effects of reservations are larger when the other group also suffers from politics of fear
factors and, as we will see, this is observable in the data.
24Both in the model, and in reality, unreserved villages have two types of leaders, a leader that was previously an incumbent, and a
new leader elected to replace an old incumbent. (Recall that, along the equilibrium path, incumbents in unreserved villages are never
successfully challenged by own-group members). The baseline version of the model predicts that, relative to incumbent As in unreserved
villages, A group leaders in reserved villages produce better governance. In an extension in section 7.9, we show that a notion of
incumbency advantage may also apply to the incumbent representative when the A group is not in power. In that case a “usual” A
representative would be assumed better able to contest for power than another A member, even when that usual representative is not
currently in power. So this would extend the notion of incumbency advantage to an advantage of incumbency as a group representative
even if not incumbent as leader. Under this assumption we generate the additional implication that even newly arriving A leaders in
unreserved villages will produce lower quality governance than reserved A leaders. So under such an extension, any unreserved village
lead by an A (whether that be an A who was already in power previously and was returned, or came to power by defeating a B)
will have lower quality governance than a reserved A lead village. In the baseline model, reserved villages will only have improved
governance relative to A leaders who were previously incumbents in unreserved villages. This difference between the two specifications
of our model has no consequence so we do not explore it in the text. The reason is that in the data, whether an unreserved leader is a
returned incumbent, or a newly elected leader replacing a previous incumbent is not observable. Consequently, the differing predictions
of both versions of the model are not relevant as we are forced to treat all unreserved villages alike, and compare them as a group with
reserved villages.
25An alternative reason for small groups gaining power in unreserved villages may be that their leader has idiosyncratic qualities that
make him particularly effective in seizing the leadership position. In Section 8.2 of the Appendix we show that allowing for individual
leader heterogeneity in this way does not alter the model’s prediction that reservations for small groups have no effect.
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the group it is likely to win the leadership again anyway. This implies that γa → 1. In that case, the increment to
re-election probability gained by maintaining an incumbent leader is small enough to provide only marginal benefits
to the group, i.e., this again implies γA− γa → 0. So, once more, there will be no impact of reservations on output.
Medium Sized Groups: Reservations should have an effect on caste groups that are a large enough proportion
of the population to contest for the leader’s position, but not so large as to be assured to win it. Groups for whom
γA − γa > 0. These groups have incumbents enjoying kleptocratic rents from the fact that they are essential (or at
least helpful) to the group’s maintaining power. Providing a guaranteed reservation of the leadership to the group
destroys those kleptocratic rents and improves governance.
We turn to testing these predictions on the effects of reservations by the proportion of the village that shares the
same caste as the village leader, and predictions (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3 shortly. Before doing so we briefly
contrast these predictions with those that would be generated by existing theories of caste based local politics.
3 Alternative Explanations
Here we discuss alternative theories that, though not in all cases designed to explore the issue of reservations and
their effects on governance, have been built to understand caste based political interactions, and could be extended
to explore the effects of reservations. Many of these models do have predictions about how governance is affected
by the size of the group receiving a reservation. We ask whether these models could also explain the inverted U
patterns of reservation effects predicted by our model.
Banerjee and Pande (2009), similar to our model, explore a setting where voters care about politicians sharing
group identity, either in and of itself, or because of expectations about policies they will select in office. In such a
setting, they argue that the party associated with the numerically dominant group will have a competitive advantage
in elevating a candidate to office. Candidates from a large group can be of lower quality, ceteris parabus, and still
receive numerous votes based solely on identity. On the other hand, for a candidate from a small group to win office,
this candidate must be high quality since his pure identity vote numbers are low. We should therefore expect to
see lower quality candidates winning office when they are representative of larger groups. Reservations would seem
to have little effect in this model for large groups. A larger group under reservation will still be able to support
a candidate of lower quality ascending to office, so not much is changed. But for small groups, there should be a
large negative effect on candidate quality. Whereas without a reservation, the group would have to put forward
an excellent candidate to win, with reservations the group wins no matter who is put up. Towards the middle of
the size distribution we should expect something between the two effects, perhaps a slight worsening of winning
candidate quality relative to small groups and a slight improvement relative to large ones. There does not seem to
be a way to generate the inverted-U shaped relationship our model predicts.
20
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) construct a citizen-candidate model primarily focused on the effects of gender
reservations. The lack of commitment to policy in the contest stage implies that, once elected, the preferences of the
representative will also affect policy. The model also includes the possibility of another effect which corresponds to
the influence of a local elite on policy, reflecting, for example, a process of local elite capture as modeled in Bardhan
and Mookherkjee (2000). Without sufficient difference between male and female preferences and not too much
influence of the local elite, reservations improve the median women’s utility. More relevant for analysis here, this
type of model may also improve governance in the direction of the median voter if it turns out that the preferences
of the females counteract the distortion that comes from the local elite. One could imagine a version of this model
with a similar effect arising to move policy towards the preferences of citizens and away from the local elite under
a caste based reservation too. However, how this could generate an inverted U shaped pattern of improvement is
less clear. If larger caste groups are more likely to have preferences closer to the local elite – this seems the most
likely assumption – then one could imagine the beneficial effects of reservations for such groups to be smaller. But
by this reasoning the effects of reservations for smaller groups would be the largest still, and middle sized groups
something between the two; again there is monotonicity of reservation effect with group size. A version of the model
where, when the reserved group is of middling size – the 25-50% range – it most closely aligns its interests with the
ruling elite (and hence against good governance) would seem to be able to generate a non-monotonicity. As we will
see, this type of explanation which is related to the village elite however, does not seem consistent with a series of
placebo tests that we report in Section 5.6. There is no inverted-U pattern between the effects of reservations and
proportion of the village that are large land-owners. If the traditional leaders are more likely to be aligned with
the local elite when the jati of the Pradhan is in the 25-50% range then this should correlate with when the large
landowners are in the 25-50% range of the village constituents, since landholding and elite status is so correlated
in our villages. But there is no such pattern.
If access to office is costly or otherwise littered with barriers that would restrict highly talented individuals from
traditionally underprivileged groups from power, then reservations, by facilitating access to such individuals may
raise the quality of representatives and thereby improve governance. Banerjee, Duflo, Imbert, Pande (2013) report
that after a reservation there are more contested elections because the leader is less likely to stand again, perhaps
freeing the path for newcomers. A recent paper by Besley et. al. (2017) for Swedish municipal elections, provides
confirmation of this possibility, albeit in a widely diverging electoral context. We can again project the effects that
such a force, if at play, would have in our context. The barriers would be greatest for smallest groups, with the larger
caste groups being those with the lowest barriers to a caste member ascending to the leadership. Consequently,
the greatest improvements should arise when reservations go to groups that are small, and therefore unlikely to be
able to obtain leadership in open contests. Highly talented individuals in such groups who are ordinarily unable
to overcome the barriers to power, would then be free to lead. In contrast, for larger groups, that would tend
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to experience smaller barriers, reservations should have smaller effects. Similarly, middle sized groups should be
somewhere between in their effects. The pattern suggested then is similar to that suggested by extending the
Banerjee and Pande (2009) model to our setting; it does not generate the inverted-U pattern distinctly predicted.
Munshi and Rosenzweig (2017) develop a model based on a markedly different departure point to that explored
here, which has emphasized group capture by a venal leader. In their model, by contrast, caste groups can impose
discipline on their leaders once in office. In fact, they assume that the disciplining power is so strong that leaders
will act in the interest of the group, even sacrificing their own, by entering in to the representative role. The
leader’s group does this by leveraging its social connections and control over the leader’s extra-political life to force
the leader to produce levels of effort required by the group. According to this perspective, leaders may even be
reluctant to take office (unlike our framework where office is coveted) but can be forced to stand and act in the
interests of their caste group once elected. This perspective clearly rules out the electorate (or one’s own group)
being captured by a selfish, lazy or corrupt representative and generates strong predictions with respect to how the
process of political reservations should interact with group size. Large groups, who highly value village level public
goods, like governance because they comprise a large chunk of the electorate, and will demand high quality elected
representatives (be it in terms of selection as they emphasize, or in terms of non-contractible effort too if that were
introduced). Smaller groups, who consume relatively little of the village public good, will demand less from their
representative, and middling groups lie somewhere in between. Reservations would not seem to matter too much in
affecting this basic monotonicity of the effect of jati group size on leadership quality. That is, it would not seem to
matter whether a large group obtains office via reservations or via direct elections in explaining this effect. So such
a model would not generate a differential between the governance outcomes comparing reserved and non-reserved
groups when interacted with jati size of the Pradhan. As they emphasize, it is purely the effect of group size that
matters. Moreover, reservations would be damaging to governance overall if they ended up making it more likely for
leaders to emerge from smaller groups. However, even if such a model could be extended to generate a differential
effect of reservations that was independent from the pure group size effect, it does not seem possible to generate
a non-monotonic effect of reservations by group size on governance quality since the model predicts a monotonic
relationship between government quality and group size. A major distinction, however, should be drawn between
their model and ours. Theirs is focused on ward level representatives – not the Pradhan. In terms of assumptions,
their model depicting a group level servant may well apply more naturally to the unpaid members representing
wards on the Panchayat. However, it would seem that ours applies better to the individuals holding the paid and
powerful leadership position of the Pradhan, which is coveted by individuals and valued when held by someone
from one’s own caste group.
Pande (2003) develops a model of political competition demonstrating that the effectiveness of political reser-
vation in altering policy depends on the nature of the contract between the electorate and the elected. In that
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model, changes in legislator identity through reservations may affect policy if there is a lack of policy commitment.
Reservations force the party to field a low caste candidate, and then if there is lack of commitment, this candidate
has freedom to undertake the policies he/she wants (to some extent). It is straightforward to see how this could
affect distributional outcomes by caste, but not so clear to see how this would effect governance quality overall, nor
how this could generate an effect on governance that displays the inverted-U pattern predicted by our model.
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2012 and 2017) argue that if caste groups are rewarded for voting in favour of a
Pradhan, even when they do not themselves elect their preferred candidate, then it may be the case that groups
with little prospect of obtaining power would still support members of another group who may be corrupt or
venal because they fear being “punished” through limited transfers and public goods when that candidate ascends
to power. In fact, there exists an equilibrium where all individuals support the traditional candidate for fear of
punishment, even if a better candidate exists, simply because they expect everyone else to support the traditional
bad candidate and fear being the odd ones out. Reservations can clearly break such an equilibrium by excluding the
bad candidate from running. Though this could improve governance, it is hard to see how this might interact with
the size of the reserved group. If larger groups are likely to have the “bad” candidate, then reservations for smaller
groups would help in improving governance, alternatively so if smaller or medium groups are more likely to have
that candidate. Again, though reservations may improve governance in such a context, a systematic non-monotonic
relationship with group size does not seem to be an outcome.
The general existence of clientelism in such villages (a recent survey is in Bardhan and Mookherjee 2017), could
be a factor distorting governance away from pro-poor and pro-development policies. Rather than elite capture
by brute force, clientelism involves transfers to non-elite in return for their political support. We have, in earlier
work, Anderson, Francois and Kotwal (2015), explored the effects of just such clientelist structures in this same
sample. We therefore agree with the prominence of clientelist structures of transfers between elites and non-elites in
our villages. But again, we have trouble envisioning how clientelism alone could explain the inverted-U pattern of
reservations effects by jati size without adding to it some sort of politics-of-fear considerations. Clientelism may lead
to numerically small elites seizing power through transfers, and acting against the village’s collective or majority
interests. If reservations break this by forcing the elite to share or vacate power to the lower castes, whether
they be numerous or not in the village, then governance quality could well increase along the dimensions that we
measure. Of course, with the right set of assumptions about how the elite’s valuation of governance interacts with
their proportionate size in the village it would seem to be possible to generate an inverted-U relationship for the
effects of governance on reservation, but there does not seem to be a natural way for this to happen purely through
clientelism.
To summarize. No existing theory predicts a non-monotonic effect of reservations by the size of the group
receiving a reservation. So this prediction of our theory is something that is worth searching for in the data. In
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addition, we will look for evidence of the interactions between the effects of reservations and the group level value of
holding village leadership, as well as the magnitude of incumbency advantages in non-reserved groups; implications
(ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3. We have not discussed these additional implications here as they are completely
unanticipated by any existing theories.
4 Data
4.1 Data Collection
The data was collected in the state of Maharashtra, which is located on the west coast of central India. Tradi-
tional Panchayats, or village councils, have been in place in this state for centuries. Politics in the village essentially
functioned as a feudal legacy of dominance, where family members of certain upper caste groups of landed lineages
persistently controlled the Panchayats. The establishment of the Bombay Village Panchayat Act of 1958, formally
enumerated the duties, responsibilities, membership, and powers of the Gram (village) Panchayats. Regular secret
ballot elections and universal franchise were formally mandated, and reservations on a lottery basis for seats on the
Panchayats for marginalized groups: lower ranked caste groups (Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and
Other Backward Castes (OBC))26 and women, but not for the Pradhan (leadership) position. Village case studies
reveal that following the introduction of democratic elections, the Pradhan position still essentially remained in the
hands of the established landed elite; other elected council members had little role to play (Kumar 2004, Gould
1967).
In accord with India’s 73rd constitutional amendment of 1992 that sought to further democratize local gover-
nance, the Bombay Village Panchayat Act of 1958 was amended to increase resources and decision making power
to the Gram Panchaysts. At this point, caste and gender reservations for the Pradhan position (the only paid
member of the Gram Panchayat) were introduced as well. The randomization of reserved Pradhan positions in each
election is on the basis of Gram Panchayat serial number rank, and random number tables provided by the Electoral
Commission. In accord with the amended Panchayat Act, the number of the Pradhan positions reserved for the SC
and ST groups are computed proportionally to the population of each caste group in the state. So the proportion
of Pradhan positions reserved for these two groups (SC and ST) can vary slightly across election cycles, depending
on relative population numbers in the state. By contrast, for the OBC group, the proportion of randomly selected
villages with the Pradhan position reserved for this caste group has been fixed at 27% since 1992. The process for
all reservations is administered via the state’s electoral commission, which is independent, not tied to any parties,
26All Hindus, the major religious group in India, are divided into a set of hereditary caste groups which fit into a traditional hierarchical
ranking: Upper, OBC, SC, and ST. Within each of these larger groupings, there are thousands of sub-castes or jatis. Traditional rules
have governed interaction within and across jatis. These include strict endogamy and restrictions on certain social interactions.
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nor to any level of government.
The villages that will have reserved Pradhan positions are typically announced by the State Election Commission
two to three months before the date of the election. Prior to each election, every individual desiring to contest for
the office of the Pradhan reserved for SC, ST, or OBC, is required to submit, along with the nomination paper, a
Caste Certificate and Validity Certificate issued by the Scrutiny Committee of the Electoral Commission.
Approximately two years after the Gram Panchayat elections were held in the year 2005, we surveyed 9132
households from 320 villages in the state of Maharashtra in 2007. Our data are from three main regions: Western
Maharashtra, Marathwada, and Vidarbha (we excluded only the Konkan coastal region whose economic hub is
Mumbai). To focus on villages that are primarily agricultural (as opposed to factory based or small market towns),
that are large enough to have their own Gram Panchayat (i.e. village government), and where social organization
is caste based, rather than tribal, our criteria for village selection was a total population of 1500-2500 and a tribal
proportion less than 10%.27 From the universe of such villages within the geographic area (a total of 22 565
villages), 320 were randomly chosen and visited by our enumeration teams. Within the villages, neighbourhoods
were identified and their approximate population shares computed. Surveying intensity within a neighbourhood was
proportional to its population share and households within neighbourhoods were randomly selected. Our sample
ends up extremely poor; 42% are below the state poverty line.28
We administered questionnaires at the household level, village level, and to the Gram Panchayats (GPs) directly.
Some information, particularly the balance sheets of the GPs, were accessed from higher level state government
offices using the “Right to Information Act”.29 In Maharashtra, a given GP typically covers a population of
approximately 2000. As a result, in our data the GPs are village specific.
Our key governance outcomes are in line with Anderson, Francois, and Kotwal (2015). GPs implement centrally
funded poverty alleviation programs, provide some public goods, represent village interests to higher level adminis-
trative units, and obtain resources from centralized funds for village projects. There is substantial variation in all
of these performance indicators across our sample of villages.
An important GP activity is pro-poor policy delivery. There are a number of such policies supposed to be
available in the full universe of our sample villages. These can be broken up into programs directly targeted to
individuals below the poverty line (BPL), and non-targeted programs that are still primarily intensively utilized by
the poor, but nominally available to all village residents. The mean number of programs available in a village is 5.33
out of a possible 15 major programs that we asked about, and when restricted to those directly targeted to BPL
27Indigenous tribal society exists in a somewhat parallel relationship to the caste system in India. Tribal villages were excluded
because their unique mode of social organization made them difficult to directly compare with the majority of traditional caste based
villages, where jati is the clear social identifier.
28That is, household income equal to less than 4367 Rs/capita/year, i.e., less than $1.25 ppp/day/capita in 2007 US dollars.
29The Panchayat Raj is the system of decentralized governance in the rural areas of India which has three levels: village (Gram
Panchayat), block (Panchayat Samiti), and district (Zilla Parishad).
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individuals the average is 1.71 out of a total of 8. Another important pro-poor policy is the state’s Employment
Guarantee Scheme (EGS). The EGS is a legal guarantee for 365 days of employment to adult members of rural
households willing to do public work-related unskilled manual labour at the statutory minimum wage.30 To operate
in a village, EGS projects must be activated by the GP from a set of possible projects, after petitioning for particular
project approval from a higher level authority. The scheme is in place in only 20% of villages. This scheme, like all
listed programs, is funded externally and administered by the GP. The GP draws up lists of eligible recipients, and
disburses entitlements to them.
Our key governance outcome variables of interest relate to: (1) the availability of government programs in the
village (as described above); and (2) government finances. For (1) we have three main measures we focus on: total
programs available in the village, those targeted to BPL, and the availability of EGS. We collected information on
program availability in both our village and household surveys. We will show all of our results for both of these
survey methods. For (2), we have three key measures which capture government finances collected in the last 24
months, i.e., two years since the election. The first is total government revenue, which primarily includes funds from
upper level governments, and to a much smaller extent stamp duty as well as water usage fees. The second is total
government expenses, which includes all expenditure on public goods, program provision, resource management,
and festivals. We will display results for funds from upper level governments separately. Refer to Tables A1 and
A2 in the Appendix for summary statistics on all of our key outcome measures.
4.2 Kernel Density Plots
Our key independent variable of interest is the reservation status of the Pradhan (the leader of the Gram
Panchayat).31 Our model predicts that if a jati is a small proportion of the village’s voters so that it almost never
wins the Pradhan’s position, then reservations should have no impact on governance. Likewise, if a jati is so large
a proportion of the village’s voters that it will almost always win elections in non-reserved villages, then reserving
a leadership position for this group will again have no impact on governance. However, reservations should have an
effect on jati groups that are a large enough proportion of the population to contest for the leader’s position, but
not so large as to be assured to win it. Providing a guaranteed reservation of the leadership to this group improves
governance.
We now turn to testing predictions regarding the effects of reservations by proportion of the village sharing the
same jati as the Pradhan (the leader of the Gram Panchayat). According to the model, what we should observe in
30It is a precursor to, and more generous version of, the current nationally administered Mahatma Ghandi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act, MNREGA).
31In India, seats are reserved for historically disadvantaged caste groups (Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Other
Backward Castes (OBC)) at all levels of government: federal, state, and throughout the Panchayat system - the system of decentralized
governance in place in the rural areas.
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the data is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the proportion of the village that shares the same caste as
the Pradhan and our measures of governance in Reserved villages relative to this same relationship in Unreserved
villages. So, we should see that the differential in governance quality between Reserved and Unreserved villages
follows an inverted U-shaped relationship with respect to the proportion of the village sharing the Pradhan’s jati.
Though the proportion of a village sharing the Pradhan’s jati is by no means exogenous, whether the village
leadership position is reserved, or not, given the size of the Pradhan’s jati is. Reservations are determined entirely
randomly via the draws of the electoral commission. So, this relationship provides a pure test of the theory.
On the other hand, our theory has nothing to say about the direct relationship between the proportion of
the village sharing the jati of the Pradhan and our measures of governance. Firstly, the jati of the Pradhan is
going to be endogenous to the jati proportions in the village. Secondly, one might expect that in villages where a
large proportion of the village ends up sharing the jati of the Pradhan, the Pradhan has a higher stake in quality
governance and could perhaps be induced to contribute more effort or be selected to be of higher quality. Though
this seems reasonable, direct relationships are not a prediction of our model, and more importantly, the form of the
direct relationships will not affect how we test for our model’s predictions.
The simplest first-brush way to look at this prediction, without taking a stance on how large a group needs to be
to contest for power, is to simply look at Kernel density plots of these predicted relationships over the whole range
of jati Pradhan proportions. Figure 1, below, plots our three key measures of government finances as a function
of the proportion of the village that shares the same jati as the Pradhan. The blue line depicts the relationship
between governance and Pradhan jati proportion in Reserved villages, the green line depicts the same relationship
in Unreserved villages. As predicted, the differential between the two does follow an inverted U-shape pattern.
***Insert Figure 1***
Figure 2 plots the same relationships for our three key measures of government program provision using the
village level data. Figure 3 plots the analogous relationships using the household level data instead. Again we see,
differentials in favour of reserved villages emerging at middle values of the Pradhan jati village proportions.
***Insert Figures 2 and 3***
A further pattern that emerges in Figures 2 and 3 is that at high levels of jati pradhan, reservations appear
to exert a negative differential effect. Our theory does not provide an explanation for this additional pattern, but
we conjecture that this is driven by the presence of ineligible for reservation and politically dominant Marathas
in the unreserved (green line) villages. Supporting that explanation, we will see in Section 4.3 that this negative
differential at the upper end no longer occurs when excluding Maratha Pradhans from the control group. However,
our main findings, which are consistent with the predictions of the model, hold independently of whether the
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Maratha Pradhans are included or not. See our earlier work, Anderson, Francois, and Kotwal (2015), for a detailed
discussion of the unique role that Marathas play in village politics.
5 Estimations
5.1 Effect of Reservations
We now turn to estimations which demonstrate that these key relationships borne out in the raw data are
robust to a series of empirical specifications, as well as the addition of controls. As emphasized, reservations for
the Pradhan position in each election are randomly allocated across villages on a lottery basis in Maharashtra. As
discussed, in accord with the Bombay Village Panchayat Act, reservations for the SC and ST groups are computed
proportionally to the population of each caste group in the state. By contrast, for the OBC group, the proportion
of randomly selected villages with the Pradhan position reserved for this caste group has been fixed at 27% since
1992.32 Table A3 in the Appendix compares village-level outcomes across reserved and unreserved villages. There
it is demonstrated that there are essentially no significant differences in terms of measures of caste composition
(using both the larger groupings of SC, ST, and OBC, as well as the smaller jati-level population numbers)33, caste
polarization and fragmentation, economic inequality, geographic endowments, and regional distributions. Thus
consistent with the allocation of reservation status across villages being random. It is also worth noting that there
are no known reports from any state in India (since the 1992 amendment) of reservations being allocated in violation
of electoral rules.
We run the following as our main estimating equations, which vary depending on whether the dependent variable
was measured at the village or household level. The household level regression is represented by the equation below:
Yik = β0 + β1RESERV EDk + ψkXik + γkZk + ik. (15)
Yik is an outcome of household i, residing in village k. Xik includes household controls (education, land
ownership, and caste identity); Zk includes village level geographic, demographic, and climate controls (latitude,
longitude, elevation, distance to natural water sources, distance to railways and national roads, soil quality measures,
rainfall levels, as well as caste population proportions and whether the land ownership is dominated by the higher
caste group (the Marathas)). RESERV EDk is our key variable of interest which is equal to 1 if the Pradhan
32Consequently, testing the model predictions is slightly cleaner for OBC groups in reserved villages since reservations for them are
not confounded by any possible effects that could arise from population frequencies across time. We show that all results persist when
we just focus on reservations for OBCs and exclude the SC reservations from the analysis in Section 7.4 of the Appendix.
33One exception is a single SC jati, the Mahars, which are slightly more represented in reserved villages (8% compared to 6% in
unreserved villages).
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is reserved for a lower caste (OBC, SC, ST) member in village k and equal to 0 otherwise.34 Therefore in these
estimations, the comparison group is unreserved Pradhans.35 ik is a regression disturbance term clustered at the
village level.
We also use village level data to explore the impact of reservations on Gram Panchayat performance measures.
We estimate the following:
Yk = β0 + β1RESERV EDk + φkZk + εk. (16)
Yk is a village level Gram Panchayat outcome measure in village k.
5.2 Baseline Estimations
Recall that the model predicts if the caste group (jati) of an incumbent is very small then he/she will be unlikely
to win re-election in an unreserved village, γA → 0, and hence there is no effect of reservations on governance
outcomes since kleptocratic rents are low: γA − γa → 0. On the other hand, if an incumbent is from a jati that
is very dominant, his group should always be able to win election even with a replacement candidate, γa → 1,
therefore there is again no effect of reservations as kleptocratic rents are similarly low: γA − γa → 0. If instead,
the candidate is from a jati which is large enough to contest elections then they are more likely to win if persisting
with the incumbent. This generates the kleptocratic rents, γA − γa > 0, so that reservations, which allow such
rents to be contested, should improve governance. Since these predictions depend on the size of the γs, and these
are unobservable, we test these implications using a series of different approaches. Our first test is to estimate (15)
and (16) for different samples of villages, based on the proportion of the village population that shares the same
jati as the Pradhan. The reasoning here is that numbers correspond with electoral power, and hence a jati’s ability
to have a candidate win the Pradhan position.
We look to the sample of villages with unreserved Pradhans to inform us of the relevant cut-offs that we should
use, i.e., how population proportions reflect the underlying γs. Table A4 in the Appendix lists the probability
of winning the Pradhan position as a function of the population share of the jati of the Pradhan in unreserved
villages for potentially reservable groups. We see that jati groups with less than 25% of the village population are
both never the largest jati in a village, and are also exceedingly unlikely to provide the Pradhan in an unreserved
village contest (approximately 2% of the time); corresponding to our γA → 0 case. Jatis which exceed 50% of
the population are very likely to provide the Pradhan position (65%); corresponding to our γa → 1 case.36 Jatis
34We also include region fixed effects.
35We include as an additional control whether the Pradhan is reserved for a woman.
36The problem with using a more stringent upper bound, for example, an upper bound of say 70%, is that this reduces the sample of
such villages to a very small number. Since our theory predicts that this is one of the regions where we should find a zero effect, having
a high upper bound almost guarantees finding a statistical zero and therefore does not test the theory. So to preserve power we use the
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between 25 and 50% are contesting jatis, and provide the Pradhan about 30% of the time in unreserved villages,
corresponding to our γA − γa > 0 case where we expect reservations should improve governance. We choose these
cutoffs for our baseline specification and will explore robustness around these cutoffs subsequently.
Our first estimations bundle the zero estimate groups together. That is, we split the villages into two groups:
one group where the jati of the Pradhan makes up between 25% and 50% of the village population - where the
theory predicts effects – and another group of villages, where the village population of the jati of the Pradhan is
either small, i.e., less than 25%, or large, i.e., greater than 50%, where the theory does not expect reservations to
significantly impact governance. The top panel of Table 1 reports the estimation results from (16) for these two
samples of villages, and the lower panel are from (15).
***Insert Table 1***
Our key outcome variables relate to the availability of government programs in the village and government
finances. Revenue includes funds from upper level governments, stamp duty, and water usage fees collected in
the last 24 months,. i.e. since the most recent election. Government expenses include all expenditure on public
goods, program provision, resource management, and festivals in the last 24 months. Committees refers to the total
number of Gram Panchayat committees out of a possible 12. They serve the purpose of overseeing issues regarding:
education, health, beneficiary selection, water usage, village development and the weekly bazaar. We see that our
key measures of governance are all significantly positively related to whether the Gram Prahdan is reserved only in
villages where the jati of the Pradhan forms between 25 and 50% of the village population.
At the household level, our key outcome measures include the availability of government programs in the village,
as well as household participation in these programs, whether households perceive that the “needy” obtain the
benefits of the program, and whether households themselves received what they were entitled to from the programs.
As per the village level variables, the key household measures of governance are all significantly positively related
to whether the Gram Prahdan is reserved. But that is the case only in villages where the jati of the Pradhan forms
between 25 and 50% of the village population.
5.3 Alternative Specifications
Below, we report alternative estimation results from (16) (top panel in Table 2) and from (15) (lower panel in
Table 2). In these we instead separate out the two uncontested categories into one where the jati of the Pradhan
is less than 25%, and another greater than 50%.
***Insert Table 2***
relatively lenient cut-off of 50%. We undertake numerous robustness tests relaxing this in what follows.
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The estimated effect of reservations in these uncontested villages is very small and statistically insignificant in
the lower group (<25%) for all of variables of interest. The same holds true in the upper group (>50%), except for
the provision of government programs, where the relationship is negative and significant; as we will see, this is not
a particularly robust finding. Similar results are found for our household measured governance variables as seen in
the lower panel.
This statistically significant negative effect of reservations in villages where the jati of the Pradhan makes up
more than 50% of the population does not persist when villages where the Pradhan is a Maratha (i.e., from the
highest ranked caste) are excluded, as seen in Table 3 below. Our main reported effects of reservations in line
with the model’s predictions, however, are all robust to doing so.37 This is consistent with our earlier conjecture
regarding a similar dip in the kernel density plots. The negative effect of reservations at high levels seems to be
explained by the disproportionately high number of Maratha Pradhans in unreserved villages there.
***Insert Table 3***
From Table 3, we see that now, for both uncontested categories, there is no significant effect of reservations in
these types of villages on our key measures of governance at either the village or household level.
Because the Pradhan jati village population share is not randomly assigned, our main estimation strategy is
to estimate (15) and (16) for different samples of villages, and focus on the estimated coefficient of the randomly
assigned reservation status for the different sub-samples of data. Alternatively we could interact the Pradhan jati
population shares with the reservation status variable. We do this in Table A6 in the Appendix. There we define
three separate dummy variables - capturing the three corresponding Prahdan jati population shares: low (less than
25%), medium (between 25% and 50%), and high (greater than 50%). We see there that all of the results of the
previous estimations follow through. That is, the significant positive effects of reservation status on governance
outcomes are only present when interacted with a dummy variable (the medium category) equal to one if the jati
of the Pradhan forms between 25 and 50% of the village population. Moreover, the negative interaction effect
of reservations with the highest Pradhan jati proportion (greater than 50%) is not statistically significant in this
specification, as consistent with Table 3. Please see Section 7.5 in the Appendix for more details.
5.4 Robustness Checks
We now explore a series of robustness checks of our baseline estimates which continue to suggest that reservations
only have a positive and significant impact on governance when going to jatis who may reasonably contest for the
Pradhan position, but are not ordinarily guaranteed it. The first consideration is the determination of the population
37Marathas are a distinct and powerful upper caste whose effects on village politics can be pronounced. This is especially the case
when they comprise the largest landowners in the village. Anderson, Francois and Kotwal (2015) explores this caste’s influence on
village politics in detail.
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cutoffs. Below, we report the estimates under varying cut-offs. In Table 4, the two key dependent variables are the
estimated average effect size (AES) of the government program variables in the earlier specifications (Programs,
BPL Programs, Income Programs, Employment Guarantee Scheme) and the government finances (Revenue, Funds,
Expenses). In the top panel, we report the estimated coefficient on Pradhan reservations using varying cut-off
measures for the proportion of the village sharing the jati of the Pradhan. The first two columns are for the whole
sample, the last two columns exclude villages with a Maratha Pradhan. We see that reservations have a significant
and positive effect on governance only in the middle category. The estimated coefficient is largest in the range
between 25 and 45%, but remains significant in all specifications if we go as low as 20% and as high as 60%. These
cutoffs correspond to what we observed in the raw data Kernel density plots of Figures 1 through 3.
***Insert Table 4***
Similar results hold for the household level data. In Table 5 below, the key dependent variable is the estimated
average effect size of the government program variables in the earlier specifications (Programs, BPL Programs,
Employment Guarantee Scheme, Program participation, Needy get benefits, Received what entitled to).
***Insert Table 5***
We now consider more carefully how we might define a contested village by considering also the population
proportion of the other main jati in the village, i.e. a prominent sub-caste group which does not share the jati of
the Pradhan. In this regard, we limit our contested villages to those where the other most prominent jati forms
at least 15% or 20% of the village population. It is first important to note, that under this criterion, we are
essentially always considering villages with two prominent jatis who do NOT share a larger caste grouping. This is
a potentially serious problem as the large caste groupings (OBC, SC) are the ones at which reservations are defined.
But since politics is organized around sub-castes or jatis, of which there are multiple within each SC and OBC caste
group, this can potentially lead to problems with our definition of a contested village. For example, a village with
a reservation for OBCs featuring two OBC jatis each of which comprises 25-30% of the village’s population (and a
number of other small non-OBC jatis) would not be one in which either one of these OBC jatis would be guaranteed
the leadership position since they are still competing with each other under reservation. Since our theory implicitly
assumes that reservations do not include two competing jatis within the same caste from competing for the reserved
position, such cases are a clear violation of our theory and the predicted effect of reservations would not apply
there. It turns out that this particular violation almost never occurs in the data. More precisely, the proportion of
villages with two prominent OBC jatis (i.e., with population numbers of at least 15%) form only 5% of the sample
villages, and those with two prominent SC castes form only 3% of the sample. It makes no difference to the results
that we report if we include or exclude these very few villages from the estimations.38
38This violation is so rare probably because of the traditional occupational distribution of villages, its correspondence with caste, and
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In the lower panel of Table 4, we report the estimated coefficient on reservation status on our average effect
size dependent variables for governance, taking into consideration the population proportion of the other prominent
jati. We see that the positive effect of reservations in our middle category (when the jati of the Pradhan forms 25
to 50% of the population) is robust to considering only villages where the other prominent jati forms at least 15%
of the population.
The final set of estimation results considers an alternative characterization of what is a contested village by
considering the size of the Pradhan’s jati relative to the main competitor jati, rather than just relative to the
village population as a whole. Our first definition is that a village is contested when the largest non-Pradhan jati’s
population falls between a half and twice of the size of the jati of the Pradhan. An uncontested village is one where
this is not true. We see that there is again evidence of reservations having a positive effect only in our contested
villages and not in the uncontested ones. Our second measure widens this spread to a minimum of a third of the
population of the Pradhan jati to triple its size, and we see that similar results ensue. The lower panel of Table 5
demonstrates that similar results hold for our governance measures from the household level survey.
5.5 Quality of the Pradhan
Although reservations are randomly determined, it is conceivable that other variables are systematically corre-
lated with our key source of variation, i.e. the proportion of the village sharing the Pradhan’s jati. One particular
consideration is the quality of the Pradhan. In fact, it is possible that the mechanism by which reservations affect
governance is through political selection and hence effects the quality of the Pradhan.39 It has been shown that
altering the electoral system may affect politician selection; for a recent example with very well identified effects of
this at local level elections (though in a different setting) see Beath et al. (2016).
Though we have not focused on the effects through a selection channel under reservations in our model, instead
emphasizing the moral hazard channel, a slight extension of the model could easily be developed to include a channel
that would operate through selection. For example, if candidates were to differ in their inherent observable qualities
(like education) or unobservables (to the researcher) like honesty, a group experiencing reservations would not fear
replacing their low quality (low education or dishonest) candidate who was ordinarily unopposed because of the
group fearing displacement from power, with a more honest or more educated one when they got a reservation. We
remain open to this being part of the mechanism through which politics-of-fear effects may operate in reality, and
the conjoined living decisions of jati members. For example, each village traditionally had a three part occupational breakdown: large
land holders, small holding cultivators, and landless workers who undertook mostly menial tasks. The latter two categories make up the
OBC and SC categories respectively. People tended to live in villages where their jati members reside, jatis are strongly endogamous,
and live proximately for reasons to do with the strong forms of within group cooperation and insurance that such groups provide; see
for example Munshi and Rosenzweig (2017) for a recent analysis. So, in a particular village, one jati tends to numerically dominate the
OBC group, and one tends to dominate the SC group. After many years of (albeit limited) migration, there is some mixing, but the
case of a single village with two large OBC groups or two large SC groups is extremely unusual.
39There is a substantial literature on how the identity of politicians influence governance. Refer to, for example, Dal Bo et. al. (2017).
33
test it here with the observables we do have.
We first demonstrate that, even if such effects are present, it is likely that there still remains a moral hazard
channel. We do this by controlling for observable characteristics of the Pradhan. In the left panel of Table 6
below we demonstrate that results from our baseline specification are robust to including other characteristics of
the Pradhan such as education, occupation, and land ownership measures (second column). They are also robust
to controlling for the Pradhan being from the Maratha caste, which can only occur in the control group, (first
column).
***Insert Table 6***
The lower set of results in Table 6 demonstrate that this robustness check also holds for our governance measures
at the household level.
Another check to see if the characteristics of the Pradhan could be contributing to our results in some manner
is to use the quality of the Pradhan as a dependent variable in an analogous estimation of (16) in contested and
uncontested villages. That is, we would like to know if the estimated coefficient of reservation status on the quality
of the Pradhan similarly follows an inverted U-shape with regards to the population share of the Pradhan’s jati, as
do our measures of governance.
Figure 4 below depicts the estimated coefficient (using (16)) of the variable reserved, in a series of estimations
that vary by the proportion of the village that shares the same jati as the Pradhan, on the education, occupation,
and landholdings of the Pradhan respectively. We see that there is no evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship
for any of these quality measures with regards to the Pradhan jati proportions.
***Insert Figure 4***
This tentatively supports a conclusion that selection does not seem to be a primary channel through which
politics-of-fear induced changes due to reservations are having their effects on governance. But this conclusion
remains somewhat tempered. Firstly, individuals within our reserved groups (once we control for jati) exhibit
remarkably little variation in education or the other observables we use. But this lack of variation may obscure
true variation in unobservables that are not correlated with these observables. We have no way of detecting that in
our data, as we only have measures that correspond with those used in similar settings.40 One dimension where we
are limited with respect to other studies in Indian villages is that we do not have information regarding the length
of a village leader’s tenure in office. So we cannot check whether new leaders tend to enter under reservations; a
potential channel of improved selection occasioned by them. As a side point, a standard question on tenure would
be unlikely to pick up such effects even if it had been asked. Many of the caste group members refer to their
40For examples as a benchmark see Munshi and Rosenzweig (2017) and Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004).
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“traditional ruling families” who tend to hold village representative positions with different male members of the
families taking turns alternating in the leadership positions. A question on individual tenure would not therefore
distinguish between cosmetic and real changes in representativeness. We would need a question on the political
experience and tenure of a representative’s family to properly observe this.
5.6 Placebo Tests
Our results could also be spuriously caused by something else if the population share of the jati of the Pradhan is
systematically correlated with some other variable affecting governance. If this were the case, then our key finding
that reservation status has a positive and significant effect on governance outcomes only in so-called contested
villages follows because our measure of what is a contested village is in fact correlated with this other relevant
variable. To this end, we consider a series of candidate variables measured at the village level, like caste proportions,
caste polarization and fractionalization, as well as village-level landholdings. To look for evidence of this possibility,
using (16), we estimate the effect of reservations on government revenue and government programs in a series
of estimations that vary by several measures of village type. That is, we first consider our village characteristic
of interest, the population share of the jati of the Pradhan. We break the population share of the jati of the
Pradhan into five groupings. The figure below depicts the estimated coefficient on reservation status in each of
these groupings. Consistent with our baseline estimates being driven by a data generating process like that of our
theory, we see that reservation status is a positive and significant determinant of governance only for the middle
categories.
***Insert Figure 5***
We now perform an analogous exercise (using (16)) for different village measures: caste polarization index;
caste fractionalization index; proportion of the village which are large land owners (> 5 acres); proportion of the
village which is from the Maratha caste, and proportion from the SC caste grouping. These are all factors which,
if exhibiting a pattern of correlation like that predicted by our theory, could spuriously generate the pattern we see
in the data. Unlike Figure 5 we never see an inverted U-type relationship with regards to the increasing values of
these village-level measures and governance indicators.
***Insert Figures 6 and 7.***
5.7 Test of η Prediction
Another prediction of the model, from Proposition 3 (part (ii)), is that the effects of reservations should be
greater, the greater is the distributional benefit to the group when they have the Pradhan’s position; the η term
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in the benefit to reservations expression which appears in the numerator and multiples
(
γA − γa) in Proposition 2.
We cannot measure η directly, but the group value of holding the Pradhan position should be higher if it is easier
for the Pradhan to target his own jati with distributional benefits. Following this reasoning, we construct a type
of Herfindahl index of jati concentration. As mentioned in Section 3, villages were surveyed along neighbourhood
lines, so using the jati population numbers in each neighbourhood, we define sj to be the number of households
who share the same jati as the Pradhan in neighbourhood j divided by the number of households who share the
same jati as the Pradhan in the entire village. We then construct an index, H =
∑n
j=1 s
2
j , which will be higher the
more concentrated is the jati in the village. If all of the Pradhan jati members are in a single neighbourhood, say
j = 1, then s1 = 1, and sj = 0 for all of the other neighbourhoods, yielding H = 1, which is the upper bound on H.
In this case, the members of the Pradhan’s jati are concentrated in a single neighbourhood, it will be easy to target
group members with local public goods, and η would be high. Alternatively, suppose instead that the members of
the Pradhan’s jati are spread equally across all neighbourhoods, then sj =
1
n for all j and H =
1
n , which is the
lower bound on H. Such a diffused jati would be more difficult to single out with targeted benefits and η would be
low. The model predicts that, in contested villages, reservations have larger effects the larger is η.
To test this prediction we estimate the following two equations, including an interacted measure of concentration.
Specifically we run the household level regression represented by the following:
Yik = β0 + β1RESERV EDk + β2RESERV EDk ∗Hk + β3Hk + ψkXik + γkZk + ik, (17)
with Hk being our index of the degree of concentration of the Pradhan’s jati village k. Our key coefficient of interest
is the interaction coefficient, β2, which our theory predicts to be positive. That is, the impact of reservations
(represented by RESERV EDk) is larger the easier it is to target the Pradhan’s jati members, as captured by a
higher Hk. The analogous village level regression is:
Yk = β0 + β1RESERV EDk + β2RESERV EDk ∗Hk + β3Hk + φkZk + εk. (18)
The last two columns on the right-hand side panel of Table 7 report the results from estimating (18) and (17).
In both cases, we have restricted the sample to those villages where reservations had an impact, that is, where the
members of the jati of the Pradhan make up between 25% and 50% of the village population. The significance
of the point estimates suggest support for the model’s prediction on interactions. That is, the positive impact
of reservations on governance outcomes seems to be larger the more concentrated are members of the jati of the
Pradhan; i.e., a higher estimated β2, for program provision and government finances in the village.
***Insert Table 7***
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5.8 Test of γB − γb Prediction
A final prediction of the model, from Proposition 3 (part (iii)), is that reservations have more impact on village
governance, the greater is the other group’s incumbency advantage, γB−γb. The other group - the group for which
political reservations do not apply - are the higher ranking Maratha caste in our context.41Due to their paramount
political dominance across the state of Maharashtra, no matter how few Marathas reside in a village, they have a
positive probability of running the government. That is, our data show that even if Marthas make up less than 5%
of the village population, they hold 15% of the leadership positions in unreserved villages. On the other hand, if
their population numbers are greater than 45%, they always hold political power in unreserved villages. Therefore,
according to our model, we should expect the impact of reservations to be higher, when the Maratha caste group
comprise less than 45% of the village population.
To test this prediction we estimate the following two equations which include an interacted measure of Maratha
representation. Specifically we run the household level regression represented by the following:
Yik = β0 + β1RESERV EDk + β2RESERV EDk ∗MLk + ψkXik + γkZk + ik, (19)
with MLk defined as a dummy variable equal to one if the proportion of Marathas in the village k is less than
45% and zero otherwise. In the Appendix (in Section 7.5), we consider alternative ways for how to define this
variable and demonstrate robustness of the estimation results which follow. Our key coefficient of interest is the
interaction coefficient, β2, which our theory predicts to be positive. That is, the impact of reservations (represented
by RESERV EDk) is larger the greater is the other group’s (i.e. Marathas) incumbency advantage (i.e., kleptocratic
rents are high). The analogous village level regression is:
Yk = β0 + β1RESERV EDk + β2RESERV EDk ∗MLk + φkZk + εk. (20)
The first two columns of the left-hand side panel of Table 7 report the results from estimating (20) and (19). In
both cases, we have restricted the sample to those villages where reservations had an impact, that is, where the
members of the jati of the Pradhan make up between 25% and 50% of the village population. The significance
of the point estimates suggest support for the model’s prediction on interactions. That is, the positive impact of
reservations on governance outcomes seems to be larger when Marthas are not the most populous group - so that
kleptocratic rents are contested - i.e., a higher estimated β2, for program provision and government finances in the
village.
41The Bombay High Court granted reservation status to Marathas in 2019 but this controversial policy change well postdates our
data collection.
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6 Conclusion
Political reservations for traditionally disadvantaged castes in Indian villages can improve the quality of gov-
ernance, not just with respect to that caste, but for the village as a whole. This is the first evidence of such an
effect to our knowledge. The pattern of improvement lines up well with what would be predicted if reservations are
acting upon politics-of-fear type situations in these villages. According to that interpretation, governance improves
under reservation due to the sclerotic nature of democracy when identity politics underlies the formation of political
groupings. The collectively beneficial activities that a government could be undertaking are sacrificed to the group
focused ones in such polities. We think these considerations are extremely relevant to the rural Indian villages in
our sample. Citizens view their elected representative firstly as an in-group member whose primary job is to provide
benefits to the group and primarily assess him on that. Secondly, he is an overall village leader and, ceteris parabus,
though it is better if he does that well too, the former consideration is clearly primary. The ensuing organization
of representatives and electors leads to a situation where a leader doing the former task well will be tolerated by a
group even when he does the latter task poorly, leading to a type of kleptocratic rent that accrues to a personalist
leader.
Extending this reasoning to explicitly analyze the political contest within a group, we show that political
reservations – by allowing the incumbent’s kleptocratic rent to be safely contested from within – are a means by which
this type of political dysfunction can be ameliorated. The model we develop demonstrates that when personalistic
politician power is greatest – in villages where a group is neither overwhelmingly powerful, nor overwhelmingly
weak – reservations should have their greatest effect. And this is exactly what we find in the data. Further, such
positive effects should be more pronounced when the value of a group’s hold on the leadership position is great, and
when other (non-reserved) contesting groups are themselves more likely to suffer from kleptocratic rents. Again,
these patterns are found in the data.
Taken to its logical conclusion, the experiment of caste based reservations suggests a broader message about how
government dysfunction can be overcome in identity based electoral systems. If politics-of-fear factors are indeed the
reason for misgovernance, and this happens because groups coalesce around identity, an extreme implication would
be that apportioning representation by identity, perhaps on a rotational basis, and dispensing with democratic
elections altogether may actually destroy political elites’ kleptocratic rents and improve governance. In our data,
these reservations for traditionally disadvantaged groups seem to have had effects in curtailing such dysfunction.
The general message is that since democracy doesn’t work well in identity based settings, as leaders capture rents
from office by dint of incumbency, a second best policy of restricting entry in to democratic contests and hence
reducing leader rents, can increase quality of representation.
Though this is a direct conclusion from our findings, there are other factors to take in to account. As Laitin
38
(1986) and Posner (2004) have argued in an African context, explicitly prioritizing group identity in the formal
political process –(here it is caste sub-groups or jatis, but it could be tribes or religions elsewhere) – may further
entrench any pre-existing tendencies individuals had to organize upon such lines in the first place. The process
of political reservations in India has been argued to have done just that (see Osborne (2001) for example), the
consequences of which are not modelled or even considered here. Going a step further and deciding leadership
eligibility solely via group identity could solidify such identities even more, and further undermine democratic
functioning.
That caveat aside, there is already considerable evidence (surveyed earlier) that reservations do affect the
distribution of public goods within villages to the benefit of reserved groups, who are traditionally marginalized.
This has been accompanied by some concern that reservations may lower the quality of governance. At least in our
sample this is not the case. Governance, by almost any measure, improves under reservations when the leader’s
group is large enough to ordinarily contest for power, but not so large as to be guaranteed power without the
reservation. We think this is an important, and heretofore unanticipated, positive effect of reservations. It is
predicted to happen when politics-of-fear factors undermine democratic competition, and it should be considered
as a possible positive when assessing the efficacy of reservations further afield.
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7 Appendix - For Online Publication
7.1 Summary Statistics
***Insert Tables A1, A2 and A3.***
7.2 Probability of Winning the Pradhan Position
We look to the sample of villages with unreserved Pradhans to inform us of the relevant cut-off populations,
i.e., the γs. The table below lists the probability of winning the Pradhan position as a function of the population
share of the jati of the Pradhan in unreserved villages. The sample is restricted to those jatis which are eligible for
political reservations (i.e., we exclude Marathas).
***Insert Table A4.***
7.3 Voting by Jati
A key assumption of the model is that voters benefit from Pradhan’s of their own jati. To provide support for
this assumption we estimate the following equation:
Yink = β0 + β1SHAREJATIk + ψkXik + γkZk + ik. (21)
Yink is an outcome of household i, residing in nieghbourhood n, in village k. Xik includes household controls
(education, land ownership, and caste identity); Zk includes village level geographic, demographic, and climate
controls (latitude, longitude, elevation, distance to natural water sources, distance to railways and national roads,
soil quality measures, rainfall levels, as well as caste population proportions and whether the land ownership is
dominated by Marathas). SHAREJATIk is our key variable of interest, which is equal to 1 if the household shares
the same jati as the Pradhan in a village k.
Below we present results from estimating (21) on households from the lower castes (OBC, SC, ST) for two key
sets of variables. The first pertain to public good provision in a household’s neighbourhood. Households report that
the two most important public goods that need improvement are access to drinking water and electricity. Below we
see that if a household shares the jati of the Pradhan that they are less likely to report problems associated with
drinking water and electricity. Neighbourhoods, where the majority of households share the jati of the Pradhan are
correspondingly more likely to report higher levels of both of these goods.
The second set of variables pertain to households’ perceptions of the Pradhan. Not only do they have a more
positive perception of a Pradhan of their own caste but they believe that he is more likely to cater to the particular
needs of their own caste.
***Insert Table A5.***
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7.4 Reservations for OBCs
Figures A1 and A2 below report the estimated effect of a reservation for OBCs on our key governance outcomes
at different population shares of the jati of the Pradhan. That is, we break the population share of the jati of the
Pradhan into five groupings. The figure below depicts the estimated coefficient (using (16)) on OBC reservation
status in each of these groupings. Consistent with our baseline estimates being driven by a data generating process
like that of our theory, we see that OBC reservation status is a positive and significant determinant of governance
only for the middle category. That is, we observe the predicted inverted U shaped relationship.
***Insert Figures A1 and A2.***
7.5 Alternative Specifications
Table A6 below presents results from estimating analogous equations to those presented in Sections 5.2 and 5.3
but using an alternative specification, where the randomly assigned reservation status of a village is interacted with
Pradhan jati population shares.
More specifically, using the household level data we estimate the below regression equation:
Yik = β0+β1RESERV EDk∗PJlk+β2RESERV EDk∗PJmk+β3RESERV EDk∗PJhk+ψkXik+γkZk+ik. (22)
where PJlk is equal to one if the village population share of the jati of the Pradhan is greater or equal to zero
and less than 25%, and equal to zero otherwise; PJmk is equal to one if the village population share of the jati of
the Pradhan is between 25 and 50%, and equal to zero otherwise; PJhk is equal to one if the village population
share of the jati of the Pradhan is greater than 50%, and equal to zero otherwise.
As in Section 5.2, we also use the village level data to explore the corresponding impact of reservations on the
Gram Panchayat performance measures and estimate the following:
Yk = β0 + β1RESERV EDk ∗ PJlk + β2RESERV EDk ∗ PJmk + β3RESERV EDk ∗ PJhk + φkZk + εk. (23)
The top panel of Table A6 below represents the results from the village level estimations, and the bottom panel
for the household level estimations. We see that the results of Sections 5.2 and 5.3 persist. That is, it is the
estimated coefficient, β2, of the interaction term RESERV EDk ∗PJmk which is a positive significant determinant
of governance quality outcomes (the results of the second column in Table A6 below).
***Insert Table A6.***
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Table A7 below presents analogous results to those in Section 5.8. In these estimations, we consider two
alternative measures of MLk. The first, ML
1
k , is equal to one if the proportion of Marathas in village k is less than
50%, and equal to zero otherwise. The second, ML2k , is equal to one if the Maratha caste group is not the largest
jati in the village, and equal to zero otherwise. We see from Table A7 below that the results presented in Section
5.8 are robust to these alternative definitions of our interaction term of interest.
***Insert Table A7.***
7.6 Proofs of Propositions in Text
Proof of Proposition 1: We proceed by imposing stationarity and thus drop all t subscripts. The optimal
group support decisions are σA∗: s = 1 if and only if GA ≥ GAC∗, σB∗: s = 1 if and only if GB ≥ GBC∗ where
GAC∗, GBC∗ are such that (10), (11), (12) and (13) bind. Given these values for the challengers, GA∗, GB∗ and
GR∗ solve: (24), (25) and (26), with the value functions of citizens defined in equations (27) to (32). The value
functions for leaders then reduce to:
V AL (A) = pi −GA∗ + η + δ
(
pV AL (R) + (1− p)
(
γAV AL (A) + (1− γA)V A(B
))
(24)
V BL (B) = pi −GB∗ + η + δ
(
pV B(R) + (1− p) (γBV BL (B) + (1− γB)V B(A))) (25)
V AL (R) = pi −GR∗ + η + δ
(
pV AL (R) + (1− p)
(
γAV AL (A) + (1− γA)V A(B
))
. (26)
In each of these, the transition function reflects support for the incumbent along the equilibrium path.
Value functions for citizens vary depending on whether the village is lead by a member of their own group, the
other group, or is reserved. If the leader is from their own group, and leadership is unreserved:
V A(A) = GA∗ + η + δ(p
(
GR∗ + η + δV A(A)
)
+ (1− p) (γAV A(A) + (1− γA)V A(B)) (27)
V B(B) = GB∗ + η + δ(p
(
GR∗ + δV B(A)
)
+ (1− p) (γBV B(B) + (1− γB)V B(A)) (28)
If the leader is from the other group and leadership is unreserved:
V A(B) = GB∗ + δ(p
(
GR∗ + η + δV A(A)
)
+ (1− p) (γBV A(B) + (1− γB)V A(A)) (29)
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V B(A) = GA∗ + δ(p
(
GR∗ + δV B(A)
)
+ (1− p) (γAV B(A) + (1− γA)V B(B)) (30)
Value functions for citizens in reserved villages are:
V A(R) = V A(A) +GR∗ −GA∗
= GR∗ + η + δ(p
(
GR∗ + η + δV A(A)
)
+ (1− p) (γAV A(A) + (1− γA)V A(B)) (31)
V B(R) = V B(A) +GR∗ −GA∗ = GR∗ + δ(p (GR∗ + δV B(A))+ (1− p) (γAV B(A) + (1− γA)V B(B)) .(32)
The continuation values thus vary depending on whether random reservation happens to the village, probability p,
and vary with the continuation winning probability of the current leader γI , I = A or B.42
In any MPE, challengers in unreserved villages must be defeated for support (weakly) by incumbents so that
conditions (10) and (11) bind. Free entry of challengers necessitates that equations (12) to (14) also bind. These
five conditions, plus equations (24) to (32), yield a system of fourteen equations in the model’s fourteen unknowns:
{V AL (A), V BL (B), V AL (R), V A(A), V B(B), V A(B), V B(A), V A(R), V B(R), GA∗, GAC∗, GB∗, GBC∗, GR∗}. This system
can be solved explicitly and yields:
GA∗
= pi/2 +
2(γa−γA)(1+(p−1)γAδ)(2γB−γb+(p−1)(γb(γA−γB−1)+2(γB)2)δ)η
(1+(p−1)(γA+γB−1)δ)((γAγb(2−2γAδ+p(2γA−1)δ)+γa(−γb(2+(p−2)δ)+2γB(1+(p−1)γBδ)))
GR∗ =
pi + 2GA∗ (p− 1) γAδ
2 + 2(p− 1)γAδ
Where the terms Φ and Θ stated in the proposition are:
Φ =
2
(
2γB − γb + (p− 1)(γb(γA − 1− γB) + 2γB2)δ))
(1 + (p− 1)(γA + γB − 1)δ
1/Θ = γAγb(2− 2γAδ + p(2γA − 1)δ)− γa (γb(2 + (p− 2)δ) + 2γB (1 + (p− 1)γBδ)) .
Since these are the unique fixed points of this system, this is the unique MPE corresponding to this game. 
42Since successful challenges to incumbents do not occur along the equilibrium path γi, i = a or b, do not feature in the citizen or
leader value functions.
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Proof of Proposition 2: From the solutions stated in Proposition 1, we obtain the expression:
GR∗−GA∗ = 2
(
γA − γa) (2γB + (p− 1)(γb(γA − 1− γB) + 2 (γB) 2)δ) η
[(1 + (1− p)(1− γA + γB)δ] [γAγb(2− 2γAδ + p(2γA − 1)δ) + γa (−γb(2 + (p− 2)δ) + 2γB (1 + (p− 1)γBδ))] .
(33)
Parameter restrictions are (p, δ, η, γA, γa, γB , γb) ∈ (0, 1). and γa ≤ γA, γb ≤ γB . We first show that this expression
can be signed when setting p = 0. Under this assumption, GR∗ −GA∗ is given by:(
γA − γa) η [γb (1− δ (1− γA + γB))+ 2γB (γBδ − 1)]
[1 + (1− γA − γB) δ] [γAγb (γAδ − 1) + γa (γb (1− δ)− γB (1− γBδ))] .
In the denominator, the term in the first square bracket: 1 − (1− γA − γB) δ > 0 because (1− γA − γB) δ < 1.
The first term in the second square bracket on the denominator is -ve since γAδ < 1. The second term in the second
square bracket is -ve because γb < γB and 1 − δ < 1 − γBδ. Hence the denominator is negative. Consider the
square bracketed term in the numerator. Necessarily γb
(
1− δγB) + 2γB (γBδ − 1) > γb (1− δ (1− γA + γB)) +
2γB
(
γBδ − 1) since 1− γA > 0. And γb (1− δγB)+ 2γB (γBδ − 1) ≡ (1− δγB) (γb − 2γB) < 0, so the numerator
is also negative implying that GR∗ −GA∗ ≥ 0 when p = 0.
Now consider GR∗ −GA∗ when p = 1. The expression simplifies to:
2
(
γA − γa) η [2γB − γb] .
This is clearly non-negative also since γa < γA, γb < γB .
For GR∗ −GA∗ to be non-negative when p = 0, and also non-negative when p = 1, but negative for values of p
between 0 and 1, it would have to be the case that GR∗−GA∗ must equal zero at at least two points in the interval
p ∈ (0, 1). But explicitly solving for p such that GR∗ −GA∗ = 0, yields:
p = 1− 2γ
B − γb
δ
(
2 (γB)
2
+ γb (γA − 1− γB)
) .
Since this is a unique point, necessarily GR∗ −GA∗ ≥ 0 for all values of pin the interval 0 to 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3: Parts (i) and (ii) are immediate from inspection of the numerator in (33). GR∗−GA∗ ≥
0, so necessarily, it is also increasing in η and
(
γA − γa).
For part (iii) define ξγb ≡ γB so that γB − γb ≡ γb (ξ − 1). Replace γB with ξγb in (33). Differentiating with
respect to ξ yields a positive term so that GR∗ −GA∗ is increasing in γB − γb.
7.7 Small groups obtaining power due to idiosyncratic leader quality
The reasons a small group winning the leadership may vary. One way of thinking about it is as a random event
which makes the group unlikely to win again, and this is how we have interpreted such events in the baseline model.
But another way to model this occurence is to introduce heterogeneity in leaders as follows. If the “random event”
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of a small group gaining power in a contested election is that the leader of this group is particularly skilled, and
therefore the group wins leadership because of this leader’s idiosyncratic quality, then the competition enhancing
effects of reservations do not apply. Providing a reservation for this group will not allow an even contest over the
kleptocratic rents (which the current leader holds and benefits from) in the same way that it does when leaders are
homogeneous. Though a reservation guarantees the group leadership for the upcoming term, if the group supports
a challenger this challenger will no longer enjoy the incumbency advantage of the original (high quality) incumbent
beyond that. Thus the group will lose control (with very high likelihood) after the period of reservation, but they
would be less likely to have done so if they persist with the current leader.
To calculate the effect of this in our model we modify the value functions so that if a leader is replaced, the
group loses leadership in the period after reservations no longer take effect. The assumption is that the replacement
is a standard type, as in our baseline model, and does not share the incumbent’s idiosyncratic quality advantage. If
such a challenger replaces the incumbent, then assuming she will not hold power again in an uncontested election
(and her kleptocratic rents are zero), her entry condition requires her providing an GAC such that:
pi −GAC + η + δ (pV RL + (1− p)V A(B)) ≥ GA + η + δ (pV A(R) + (1− p)(γAV A(A) + (1− γA)V A(B))) . (34)
Solving for the GAC∗, which binds above, yields the level of effort that the incumbent would have to produce to
stave off such a challenge. From the perspective of citizens, it must be the case that citizens would rather have the
challenger at the best feasible governance level offered, GAC∗ above, instead of persisting with the incumbent under
GA. Namely:
GAC∗ + η + δ
(
pV A(R) + (1− p)V A(B))
> GA + η + δ
(
pV A(R) + (1− p) (γAV A(A) + (1− γA)V A(B))) .(35)
Using the binding GAC∗ from (34) and substituting into (35) yields:
GAC∗ + η + δ
(
pV A(R) + (1− p)V A(B)) > pi −GAC∗ + η + δ (pV RL + (1− p)V A(B)) .
But note that V A(R) = V RL , since this is a group for which γ
A − γa → 0, which implies that GA = pi2 from then
on for this challenger (as there is no kleptocratic rent for such a leader). Imposing V A(R) = V RL in the condition
above now reduces the inequality to:
GAC∗ >
pi
2
.
This inequality implies that for a standard quality challenger under reservations to be preferred to the idiosyn-
cratically high quality incumbent, this entrant must offer governance under the challenge that strictly exceeds that
which would leave them indifferent to taking the leadership position. So any feasible entrant would not be chosen to
displace an idiosyncratically high quality leader under reservations. Thus reservations have no effect in such cases.
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7.8 Non-randomized reservations
Within the broad parameters set by the 73rd constitutional amendment that mandated reservations, there is
considerable freedom for states to implement reservations in differing ways and to differing groups. For instance,
though reservations for SCs, STs, and women were mandated across all states in some form, extending reservations
to OBCs was optional and discretionary on the part of state governments. Despite numerous attempts, we have
been unable to obtain from the Maharashtrian electoral commission, their position on repeated reservations for a
single village across election cycles.
We have built the formal model under the assumption that caste based reservations are IID, so that a reserved
village – which received a reservation with probability p in the current cycle, has the equivalent probability of being
reserved in the subsequent cycle. This is reflected throughout the model set-up, and its effects can be most clearly
seen in equations (26), (31) and (32), where the p term denotes the probability of a currently reserved village
receiving a reservation again. However, if the electoral commision uses some alternative conditioning factors in
determining reservations for consecutive elections, for example if they allocate them with a lower probability to a
village that is currently under reservation, say denoted pl < p where it is possible that pl = 0, then equation (26)
changes to:
V AL (R) = pi −GR∗ + η + δ
(
plV
A
L (R) + (1− pl)
(
γAV AL (A) + (1− γA)V A(B
))
,
and equations (31) and (32) to:
V A(R) = GR∗ + η + δ(pl
(
GR∗ + η + δV A(A)
)
+ (1− pl)
(
γAV A(A) + (1− γA)V A(B))
V B(R) = GR∗ + δ(pl
(
GR∗ + δV B(A)
)
+ (1− pl)
(
γAV B(A) + (1− γA)V B(B)) .
It turns out that adding this extra parameter to the system of equations no longer allows us to obtain a closed form
solution. But the solution behaves qualitatively identically to the baseline model when solved numerically. In fact,
the effects of reservations on governance are actually more pronounced in this version of the model. The intuition
for this follows from the discussion surrounding the corollary above. That corollary showed that in reserved villages
governance quality exceeds first-best levels; representatives contesting for office are willing to offer governance
making them strictly worse off than their constituents. They do this because they will become incumbents in
subsequent periods (with a positive probability) and hence have the chance to extract kleptocratic rents in to the
future. Lowering pl below p simply raises the chance of the now reserved leader remaining relatively unchallenged in
future. In the limit, when pl = 0, the candidate the group puts foward to lead in the reserved period is guaranteed
to be able to re-stand in the next period, without the threat of increased competition under reservations from his
own group; that is, if he wins re-election he is guaranteed at least one period of kleptocratic rents. In the current
version of the model, he only obtains the extra period of rents with probability p. After that period, the value
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functions are identical, so necessarily the effects of reservations in improving governance are greater when pl = 0.
7.9 Incumbency advantages when out of office
Now suppose that there exists, for each group, a “usual” representative. This is someone who, even even when
not currently in office, has a higher chance of winning power than would be had by a replacement representative
drawn from the group. We show here that this would similarly generate kleptocratic rents for that group’s incum-
bent representative. Though this is not essential to the main results, and actually generates no extra empirical
implications, it illustrates a complementary channel by which reservations may improve governance.
To simplify things, this effect can be illustrated in a static version of the model. So for this extension drop the
time notation, t and assume that all effects are instantaneous. Then an A challenger offering GAC is indifferent to
entering pre-selection against an incumbent offering GA if:
γa
(
pi −GAC + η)+ (1− γa)GB = γA (GA + η)+ (1− γA)GB . (36)
As in the fully fledged model, the challenger takes in to account that, by his contesting the election instead of the
incumbent, his group has a lower chance of winning, γa ≤ γA, and that in the event he loses this will cost him
personally as a citizen since η will be foregone. We ignore the continuation values for this example.
So this implies that A′s group will be indifferent between continuing to support their incumbent, offering GA,
and selecting their challenger offering GAC if:
γA
(
GA + η
)
+
(
1− γA)GB = γa (GAC + η)+ (1− γa)GB . (37)
The group also accounts for the lower electability of the replacement representative.
The level of GB under which a member of group B is indifferent to standing for election as a representative of
group B, or remaining a non-politician is:
(
1− γA) (pi −GB + η)+ γAGA = (1− γA) (GB + η)+ γAGA. (38)
The solution to these equations yields:
GB = GAC =
pi
2
,
and
GA =
pi
2
−
(
γA − γa)
γA
η.
The second term in the expression above denotes the leader’s kleptocratic rent in this toy model, and is the analogue
of the term η(γA − γa)ΘΦ in Proposition 2 of the full intertemporal model. In this toy model, reservations will
have a similar effect to their effect in the full model. By assuring the group A that they will come to power for
sure after the next election, there becomes no reason to tolerate a lower level of governance quality from their usual
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representative. Consequently, governance under reservations improves up to the level of indifference to being leader,
that is to pi/2.
Using this toy model expression as our baseline, now define a new term: γB
′ ≥ γB as the probability of a B
incumbent being returned to office if he is challenged by a novice challenger from the A group instead of their
“usual” representative. And assume that the A group are not currently in power. Leadership is held by a B.
So now the “usual” challenger can be thought of as that member of the A group who, by dint of currently being
their representative, has the best chance of winning in the next election if he continues to represent the group,
even though he is not in power. In that case, starting with a B leader in office, A group members are indifferent
to standing as a novice representative challenging for leadership on behalf of their group instead of their usual
representative if: (
1− γB′
)(
pi −GA′C + η
)
+ γB
′
GB =
(
1− γB) (GA′ + η)+ γBGB , (39)
where GA
′
denotes the level of governance offered by the A group’s incumbent representative, and GA
′C denotes the
level of governance offered by the challenger to the incumbent representative. Members of the A group are indifferent
between continuing to support their incumbent representative, offering GA
′
, and chance 1− γB of winning, versus
selecting a new challenger offering GA
′C and lower chance 1− γB′ of winning if:
(
1− γB) (GA′ + η)+ γBGB = (1− γB′)(GA′C + η)+ γB′GB . (40)
These two equations immediately yield GA
′C = pi/2. And using GB = pi2 from the previous yields:
GA
′
=
pi
2
−
(
γB
′ − γB
)
1− γB η. (41)
Hence a similar wedge between first best levels of governance, and the level that is provided by an elected A leader
who is the usual representative of a group is generated. Here, the “incumbency advantage” comes from the usual
representative being better able to defeat an incumbent B leader, than would any other leader appointed from
the A group. That is, the term
(
γB
′−γB
)
1−γB η is the analogue of the term η(γ
A − γa)ΘΦ in Proposition 2 of the full
intertemporal model.
So such a usual representative can again offer lower governance quality than a rival, and still receive the group’s
support because he offers the group the best chance of coming to power. Once again reservations will have a similar
effect to their effect in the full model. By assuring the group A that they will come to power for sure after the next
election, there becomes no reason to tolerate a lower level of governance quality from their usual representative.
Consequently, governance under reservations improves analogously up to pi/2.
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Table 1 - Baseline Estimations of Governance Measures
Variable
25% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 50%
 
Jati Pradhan  25% / Jati Pradhan  50%
 
GP Measures
All programs 2.01 (0.90)** -0.55 (0.39)
BPL programs 0.81 (0.30)*** -0.16 (0.14)
Income programs 1.81 (0.82)** -0.54 (0.36)
Employment Guarantee Scheme 0.13 (0.07)** -0.02 (0.04)
Revenue/capita 793.9 (246.1)*** 51.9 (89.3)
Funds/capita 298.5 (128.8)** 30.2 (44.4)
Expenses/capita 706.6 (386.8)** 95.5 (87.9)
Number of Committees 1.56 (0.71)** -0.05 (0.25)
Observations 65 179
Household Measures
All programs 1.69 (0.74)** -0.50 (0.38)
BPL programs 0.71 (0.26)*** -0.16 (0.13)
Employment Guarantee Scheme 0.11 (0.06)* -0.02 (0.04)
Program participation 0.50 (0.23)** -0.08 (0.12)
Needy get benefits 1.37 (0.66)** -0.13 (0.33)
Received what entitled to 0.68 (0.34)** -0.05 (0.17)
Observations 1869 4990
Notes: The top panel of the table reports estimation results using the GP level data. These estimations include
geographic, demographic, climatic, and also regional controls. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Refer
to Table A1 in the Appendix for more information on the variables in these estimations. The bottom panel of
the table reports estimation results using the household level data. In these estimations, regression disturbance
terms are clustered at the village level and robust standard errors are in parentheses. These estimations include
geographic, demographic, climatic, regional, and household controls. Refer to Table A2 in the Appendix for more
inforation on the variables in these estimations. A single asterix denotes significance at the 10% level, double for
5%, and triple for 1%.
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Table 2 - Estimations of Governance Measures - Uncontested Categories
Variable
 
[Jati Pradhan  25%]
 
[25% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 50%]
 
[Jati Pradhan  50%]
GP Measures
All programs 0.12 (0.56) 2.01 (0.90)** -2.34 (0.94)***
BPL programs 0.06 (0.19) 0.81 (0.30)*** -0.74 (0.37)**
Income programs 0.11 (0.51) 1.81 (0.82)** -2.13 (0.88)**
Employment Guarantee Scheme 0.03 (0.05) 0.13 (0.07)** -0.12 (0.09)
Revenue/capita -38.7 (38.4) 793.9 (246.1)*** 71.6 (160.9)
Funds/capita -7.1 (13.4) 298.5 (128.8)** 29.3 (82.3)
Expenses/capita 16.2 (22.9) 706.6 (386.8)** 119.3 (166.2)
Number of Committees -0.07 (0.42) 1.56 (0.71)** -0.10 (0.34)
Observations 100 65 79
Household Measures
All programs 0.32 (0.51) 1.69 (0.74)** -2.37 (0.90)***
BPL programs 0.11 (0.18) 0.71 (0.26)*** -0.74 (0.39)*
Employment Guarantee Scheme 0.05 (0.05) 0.11 (0.06)* -0.11 (0.08)
Program participation 0.18 (0.18) 0.50 (0.23)** -0.57 (0.26)**
Needy get benefits 0.40 (0.45) 1.37 (0.66)** -1.49 (0.77)*
Received what entitled to 0.30 (0.25) 0.68 (0.34)** -0.80 (0.34)**
Observations 2744 1869 2246
Notes: The top panel of the table reports estimation results using the GP level data. These estimations include
geographic, demographic, climatic, and also regional controls. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Refer
to Table A1 in the Appendix for more information on the variables in these estimations. The bottom panel of
the table reports estimation results using the household level data. In these estimations, regression disturbance
terms are clustered at the village level and robust standard errors are in parentheses. These estimations include
geographic, demographic, climatic, regional, and household controls. Refer to Table A2 in the Appendix for more
inforation on the variables in these estimations. A single asterix denotes significance at the 10% level, double for
5%, and triple for 1%.
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Table 3 - Estimations of Governance Measures - Excluding Villages with a Maratha Pradhan
Variable
 
[Jati Pradhan  25%]
 
[25% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 50%]
 
[Jati Pradhan  50%]
GP Measures
All programs 0.76 (0.77) 2.42 (1.15)** 0.22 (0.58)
BPL programs 0.20 (0.27) 0.88 (0.40)** 0.21 (0.23)
Income programs 0.67 (0.71) 2.18 (1.03)** 0.23 (0.52)
Employment Guarantee Scheme 0.03 (0.06) 0.17 (0.06)*** 0.05 (0.05)
Revenue/capita -50.9 (46.7) 965.8 (324.4)*** 667.9 (690.4)
Funds/capita -0.07 (12.5) 411.5 (145.5)*** 332.8 (341.5)
Expenses/capita 11.3 (27.8) 903.2 (391.1)** 604.5 (752.5)
Number of Committees -0.27 (0.52) 1.81 (0.86)** -0.41 (0.94)
Observations 88 43 32
Household Measures
All programs 0.87 (0.68) 1.95 (0.83)** -0.76 (0.73)
BPL programs 0.24 (0.24) 0.72 (0.30)** -0.22 (0.30)
Employment Guarantee Scheme 0.06 (0.05) 0.13 (0.06)** -0.07 (0.07)
Program participation 0.33 (0.22) 0.60 (0.28)** -0.01 (0.23)
Needy get benefits 0.87 (0.59) 1.55 (0.78)** -0.39 (0.72)
Received what entitled to 0.41 (0.30) 0.85 (0.42)** -0.11 (0.30)
Observations 2446 1235 765
Notes: The top panel of the table reports estimation results using the GP level data. These estimations include
geographic, demographic, climatic, and also regional controls. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Refer
to Table A1 in the Appendix for more information on the variables in these estimations. The bottom panel of
the table reports estimation results using the household level data. In these estimations, regression disturbance
terms are clustered at the village level and robust standard errors are in parentheses. These estimations include
geographic, demographic, climatic, regional, and household controls. Refer to Table A2 in the Appendix for more
inforation on the variables in these estimations. A single asterix denotes significance at the 10% level, double for
5%, and triple for 1%.
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Table 4 - Estimations of GP-Level Governance Measures
Whole Sample: Excluding Maratha Pradhan Villages:
Sample
Government
Programs (AES)
 
Government
Finances (AES)
 
Government
Programs (AES)
 
Government
Finances (AES)
 
Lower Category:
Jati Pradhan  25% 0.08 (0.29) -4.0 (22.7) 0.36 (0.36) -3.2 (23.1)
Jati Pradhan  20% 0.26 (0.34) -2.2 (22.0) 0.52 (0.41) -0.3 (25.5)
Jati Pradhan  15% 0.49 (0.45) -25.8 (31.9) 0.53 (0.44) 15.8 (30.1)
Middle Category:
25% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 50% 1.19 (0.43)*** 518.5 (169.1)*** 1.38 (0.48)*** 612.9 (190.2)***
20% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 50% 0.82 (0.38)** 281.3 (125.7)** 1.12 (0.42)*** 524.5 (133.1)***
15% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 50% 0.45 (0.32) 244.8 (98.4)*** 0.77 (0.38)* 501.4 (119.1)***
25% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 45% 1.47 (0.41)*** 679.5 (199.3)*** 1.57 (0.45)*** 624.5 (229.7)***
20% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 45% 0.85 (0.38)** 291.1 (140.6)** 1.33 (0.44)*** 525.9 (164.9)***
15% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 45% 0.45 (0.32) 250.8 (106.8)** 0.82 (0.38)** 455.7 (137.5)***
25% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 60% 0.71 (0.37)** 472.4 (140.2)*** 1.31 (0.39)*** 653.3 (173.3)***
25% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 75% 0.33 (0.31) 312.6 (108.6)*** 0.73 (0.34)** 594.5 (163.2)***
25% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 1 0.02 (0.32) 558.3 (165.6)*** 0.65 (0.34)** 292.4 (96.0)***
Upper Category:
Jati Pradhan  50% -1.33 (0.44)*** 73.4 (130.9) -0.31 (0.47) 73.4 (130.9)
Jati Pradhan  45% -0.91 (0.40)** 110.7 (108.1) 0.30 (0.56) 110.7 (108.1)
Contesting Castes:
Jati Pradhan  25% (Other Jati ≥ 15%) 0.08 (0.29) -4.0 (22.7) 0.36 (0.36) -3.2 (23.1)
Jati Pradhan  25% (Other Jati ≥ 20%) 0.08 (0.29) -4.0 (22.7) 0.36 (0.36) -3.2 (23.1)
25% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 50% (Other Jati ≥ 15%) 1.19 (0.43)*** 518.5 (169.1)*** 1.38 (0.48)*** 612.9 (190.2)***
25% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 50% (Other Jati ≥ 20%) 1.19 (0.43)*** 518.5 (169.1)*** 1.38 (0.48)*** 612.9 (190.2)***
Jati Pradhan  50% (Other Jati ≥ 15%) -1.33 (0.44)*** 73.4 (130.9) -0.31 (0.47) 73.4 (130.9)
Jati Pradhan  50% (Other Jati ≥ 20%) -1.33 (0.44)*** 73.4 (130.9) -0.31 (0.47) 73.4 (130.9)
[0.5*Jati Pradhan ≤ Other Jati ≤ 2*Jati Pradhan]=1 0.57 (0.36) 360.9 (115.4)*** 0.84 (0.47)* 334.8 (108.6)***
[0.5*Jati Pradhan ≤ Other Jati ≤ 2*Jati Pradhan]=0 -0.05 (0.21) 64.0 (45.3) 0.43 (0.33) 110.8 (70.3)
[0.33*Jati Pradhan ≤ Other Jati ≤ 3*Jati Pradhan]=1 0.22 (0.33) 221.8 (89.5)*** 0.72 (0.46) 324.2 (103.7)***
[0.33*Jati Pradhan ≤ Other Jati ≤ 3*Jati Pradhan]=0 -0.09 (0.22) 83.5 (53.7) 0.40 (0.36) 130.5 (83.7)
Notes: All estimations include GP, geographic, demographic, climatic, and regional controls. A single asterix
denotes significance at the 10% level, double for 5%, and triple for 1%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
The two dependent variables are the estimated average effect size (AES) of the government program variables
(Programs, BPL Programs, Income Programs, Employment Guarantee Scheme) and government finances (Revenue,
Funds, Expenses).
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Table 5 - Estimations of Household-Level Governance Measures
Whole Sample: Excluding Maratha Pradhan Villages:
Sample
Government Programs (AES)
 
Government Programs (AES)
 
Lower Category:
Jati Pradhan  25% 0.19 (0.25) 0.44 (0.33)
Jati Pradhan  20% 0.19 (0.28) 0.52 (0.35)
Jati Pradhan  15% 0.57 (0.43) 0.57 (0.44)
Middle Category:
25% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 50% 0.82 (0.37)** 0.92 (0.43)**
20% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 50% 0.49 (0.29)* 0.71 (0.33)**
15% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 50% 0.32 (0.22) 0.54 (0.29)*
25% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 45% 1.13 (0.35)*** 1.24 (0.39)***
20% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 45% 0.56 (0.29)** 0.94 (0.35)***
15% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 45% 0.29 (0.23) 0.62 (0.30)**
25% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 60% 0.54 (0.29)* 0.99 (0.30)***
25% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 75% 0.21 (0.28) 0.56 (0.32)*
25% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 1 -0.02 (0.29) 0.56 (0.32)*
Upper Category:
Jati Pradhan  50% -1.01 (0.43)** -0.26 (0.36)
Jati Pradhan  45% -0.77 (0.38)** 0.31 (0.54)
Contesting Castes:
Jati Pradhan  25% (Other Jati ≥ 15%) -0.16 (0.29) 0.44 (0.33)
Jati Pradhan  25% (Other Jati ≥ 20%) -0.16 (0.29) 0.44 (0.33)
25% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 50% (Other Jati ≥ 15%) 0.82 (0.37)** 0.92 (0.43)**
25% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 50% (Other Jati ≥ 20%) 0.82 (0.37)** 0.92 (0.43)**
Jati Pradhan  50% (Other Jati ≥ 15%) 0.10 (0.81) -0.26 (0.36)
Jati Pradhan  50% (Other Jati ≥ 20%) 0.10 (0.81) -0.26 (0.36)
[0.5*Jati Pradhan ≤ Other Jati ≤ 2*Jati Pradhan]=1 0.33 (0.28) 0.51 (0.30)*
[0.5*Jati Pradhan ≤ Other Jati ≤ 2*Jati Pradhan]=0 -0.003 (0.18) 0.28 (0.22)
[0.33*Jati Pradhan ≤ Other Jati ≤ 3*Jati Pradhan]=1 0.29 (0.24) 0.50 (0.26)*
[0.33*Jati Pradhan ≤ Other Jati ≤ 3*Jati Pradhan]=0 -0.07 (0.20) 0.24 (0.25)
Notes: Regression disturbance terms are clustered at the village level and robust standard errors are in paren-
theses. All estimations include geographic, demographic, climatic, regional, and household controls. A single
asterix denotes significance at the 10% level, double for 5%, and triple for 1%. The dependent variable is the esti-
mated average effect size (AES) of the household level government program variables (Programs, BPL Programs,
Employment Guarantee Scheme, Program participation, Needy get benefits, Received what entitled to).
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Table 6 - Estimations on Villages with 25% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 50% - Robustness Checks
Variable
 
[Controlling for Maratha Pradhan]
 
[Controlling for Pradhan Characteristics]
GP Measures
All programs 2.03 (0.88)** 2.10 (0.95)**
BPL programs 0.81 (0.30)*** 0.83 (0.32)***
Income programs 1.83 (0.80)** 1.89 (0.86)**
Employment Guarantee Scheme 0.13 (0.06)** 0.13 (0.07)*
Revenue/capita 714.0 (217.8)*** 665.4 (250.3)***
Funds/capita 250.1 (115.4)** 222.9 (129.2)*
Expenses/capita 630.0 (300.2)** 605.9 (342.9)*
Number of Committees 1.56 (0.68)** 1.60 (0.66)**
Observations 65 65
Household Measures
All programs 1.77 (0.74)** 1.80 (0.84)**
BPL programs 0.73 (0.27)*** 0.75 (0.30)***
Employment Guarantee Scheme 0.12 (0.06)** 0.17 (0.06)***
Program participation 0.50 (0.24)** 0.62 (0.25)***
Needy get benefits 1.43 (0.66)** 1.43 (0.74)**
Received what entitled to 0.67 (0.35)** 0.74 (0.34)**
Observations 1869 1869
Notes: The top panel of the table reports estimation results using the GP level data. These estimations include
geographic, demographic, climatic, and also regional controls. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Refer
to Table A1 in the Appendix for more information on the variables in these estimations. The bottom panel of
the table reports estimation results using the household level data. In these estimations, regression disturbance
terms are clustered at the village level and robust standard errors are in parentheses. These estimations include
geographic, demographic, climatic, regional, and household controls. Refer to Table A2 in the Appendix for more
inforation on the variables in these estimations. A single asterix denotes significance at the 10% level, double for
5%, and triple for 1%. Pradhan characteristics include their education level and land ownership..
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Table 7 - Estimations on Villages with 25% ≤ Jati Pradhan ≤ 50% - Interaction Effects
Variable     ∗     ∗
GP Measures
All programs -1.12 (0.76) 3.27 (0.75)*** 0.43 (0.94) 3.3 (2.0)*
BPL programs -0.06 (0.25) 0.82 (0.24)*** 0.24 (0.32) 1.2 (0.65)*
Income programs -1.13 (0.69) 3.06 (0.71)*** 0.37 (0.88) 2.99 (1.81)*
Employment Guarantee Scheme -0.19 (0.05)*** 0.32 (0.06)*** 0.02 (0.08) 0.26 (0.14)*
Revenue/capita 12.0 (122.9) 450.9 (215.4)** 388.2 (319.9) 826.4 (469.1)*
Funds/capita -4.4 (63.1) 194.9 (97.1)** 82.5 (161.5) 445.9 (261.9)*
Expenses/capita -4.6 (133.3) 438.3 (213.6)** 353.1 (300.1) 735.1 (470.4)†
Observations 65 65 65 65
Household Measures
All programs -1.93 (1.29) 3.52 (1.34)*** 0.75 (0.77) 2.68 (1.53)*
BPL programs -0.36 (0.46) 0.97 (0.48)** 0.26 (0.34) 1.03 (0.63)*
Employment Guarantee Scheme -0.38 (0.14)*** 0.48 (0.14)*** 0.004 (0.08) 0.26 (0.14)*
Program participation -0.67 (0.37)* 1.13 (0.39)*** 0.11 (0.27) 0.84 (0.54)†
Needy get benefits -1.39 (0.99) 2.63 (1.04)*** 0.40 (0.68) 2.26 (1.38)*
Received what entitled to -0.92 (0.54)* 1.52 (0.60)*** 0.09 (0.48) 1.26 (0.76)*
Observations 1869 1869 1869 1869
Notes: The top panel of the table reports estimation results using the GP level data. These estimations include
geographic, demographic, climatic, and also regional controls. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Refer
to Table A1 in the Appendix for more information on the variables in these estimations. The bottom panel of
the table reports estimation results using the household level data. In these estimations, regression disturbance
terms are clustered at the village level and robust standard errors are in parentheses. These estimations include
geographic, demographic, climatic, regional, and household controls. Refer to Table A2 in the Appendix for more
inforation on the variables in these estimations. A single asterix denotes significance at the 10% level, double for
5%, and triple for 1%.
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Table A1 - Summary Statistics - Village Level Data
Variable Mean (Standard Deviation)
All Programs 5.33 (2.56)
BPL Programs 1.71 (0.89)
Income Programs 4.81 (2.36)
Employment Guarantee Scheme 0.20 (0.21)
Revenue/Capita 149.8 (360.8)
Funds/Capita 55.6 (186.2)
Expenses/Capita 138.5 (359.2)
Number of Committees 3.66 (1.71)
Reserved OBC 0.28 (0.45)
Reserved SC/ST 0.14 (0.34)
Proportion Jati Pradhan 0.37 (0.26)
Proportion OBC 0.28 (0.26)
Proportion SC/ST 0.27 (0.19)
Proportion Maratha 0.41 (0.31)
Pradhan - Cultivator 0.84 (0.36)
Pradhan - Large Land Owner 0.66 (0.47)
Pradhan - High Education 0.75 (0.43)
Caste Polarization 0.68 (0.18)
Caste Fractionalization 0.33 (0.18)
Large Land Owners 0.29 (0.13)
Observations 320
Notes: Data comes from our Village and Gram Panchayat Level Surveys that we administered in the eld,
as well as the books of the Gram Panchayats, as well as the information we obtained using the RTI Act. Total
Programs refers to the total number of the possible 15 Government Schemes implemented in the village. BPL
refers to the number of the possible 8 programs targeted at individuals below the poverty line. Revenue/capita
refers to data collected from the balance sheets (covers last 24 months) submitted by the GPs (obtained using
RTI Act). Revenue primarly comprises funds (resources optained from upper level governments), and to a much
smaller extent stamp duties and some taxes (mainly on water usage). Expenses/capita refers to data collected from
the balance sheets (covers last 24 months) submitted by the GPs (obtained using RTI Act). Expenditure items
include public goods, subsidies, resource management, and festivals. Number of committees refers to the total
number of GP committees out of a possible 12 that exist in the village. These serve the purpose for issues such as
education, heatlh, beneciary slection, water usage, village development, and the weekly bazaar. Large land owner
refers to a household with more than 5 acres of land. The measure of Caste Polarization is taken from Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol (2005): POLARIZEk = 1  
NX
i=1

1
2
 i
1
2
2
i, wherei is the proportion of the village
population that belongs to jati i. This index is meant to capture how far the distribution of jati groups is from
the (1/2, 0, 0, ..., 0, 1/2) distribution (bipolar), which represents the highest level of polarization.Our measure of
caste fractionalization is represented by: FRAC =
PN
i=1 i(1 i). (Again from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
2005, which is meant to capture the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a given village will
not belong to the same sub-caste).
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Table A2 - Summary Statistics - Household Level Data
Variable Mean (Standard Deviation)
All programs 5.35 (3.14)
BPL programs 1.72 (1.18)
Employment Guarantee Scheme 0.20 (0.40)
Program Participation 1.49 (1.42)
Needy get benets 4.31 (3.06)
Received what entitled to 2.17 (1.73)
Maratha Caste 0.38 (0.49)
OBC Caste 0.31 (0.45)
Scheduled Caste 0.23 (0.42)
Scheduled Tribe 0.06 (0.24)
Less than primary school - Females 0.53 (0.50)
Less than primary school - Males 0.28 (0.45)
Total land owned 2.05 (1.75)
Observations 9218
Notes: Data comes from our household level surveys. Programs refer to the households' response as to whether
government programs exist in the village. Program participation refers to whether the household participated in
these programs. Needy get benets refers to whether the household percieves that the needy of the village are
beneting from these programs. Received what entitled to refers to whether the household received what they
were entitled to from the programs. Less than primary refers to the highest level of completed education in the
household is less than primary school. Land owned is in acres.
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Table A3 - Village Characteristics by Reservation Status
Variable Reserved Unreserved Equivalence of Means
Proportion OBC 0.28 (0.02) 0.28 (0.02) -0.003 (0.03)
Proportion SC 0.22 (0.01) 0.19 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)**
Proportion ST 0.08 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02)
Proportion Maratha 0.35 (0.02) 0.37 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03)
Proportion Mang 0.03 (0.005) 0.03 (0.004) 0.0003 (0.006)
Proportion Mali 0.03 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.003 (0.01)
Proportion Mahar 0.08 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) 0.026 (0.012)**
Proportion Chambar 0.01 (0.002) 0.02 (0.002) 0.003 (0.003)
Proportion Dhangar 0.08 (0.01) 0.08 (0.01) 0.007 (0.02)
Proportion Kunabi 0.07 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01) 0.005 (0.02)
Proportion Wanjari 0.03 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.016 (0.014)
Caste Polarization 0.66 (0.01) 0.66 (0.01) 0.0002 (0.02)
Caste Fragementation 0.62 (0.02) 0.60 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02)
Proportion Large Land Owners 0.28 (0.01) 0.30 (0.01) -0.02 (0.014)
Proportion Educated 0.72 (0.01) 0.72 (0.01) -0.001 (0.01)
Gini - Land Ownership 0.63 (0.01) 0.61 (0.01) 0.016 (0.012)
Gini - Household Income 0.51 (0.01) 0.50 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Village Population 388.0 (14.0) 394.4 (10.2) -6.4 (16.8)
Distance to Water 3023.3 (209.8) 2716.9 (148.3) 306.4 (249.5)
Distance to Road 2414.6 (234.1) 2942.7 (206.3) -328.1 (313.3)
Distance to Rail 22652.6 (1617.3) 22768.7 (1405.3) -116.1 (2147.6)
Rainfall 297.7 (11.2) 295.3 (9.1) 2.4 (14.3)
Soil Quality Index 12.7 (0.3) 12.4 (0.1) 0.3 (0.3)
Marathwada 0.40 (0.04) 0.41 (0.04) -0.01 (0.05)
Western Maharashtra 0.33 (0.04) 0.28 (0.03) -0.04 (0.05)
West Vidarbha 0.19 (0.03) 0.24 (0.03) -0.05 (0.05)
East Vidarbha 0.05 (0.02) 0.05 (0.01) 0.002 (0.02)
Observations 135 185
Notes: Data on caste composition comes from our Village Level Survey.The measure of Caste Polarization
is taken from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005): POLARIZEk = 1  
NX
i=1

1
2
 i
1
2
2
i, wherei is the
N
proportion of the village population that belongs to jati i. This index is meant to capture how far the distribution 
of jati groups is from the (1/2, 0, 0, ..., 0, 1/2) distribution (bipolar), which Prepresents the highest level of 
polarization.Our measure of caste fractionalization is represented by: FRAC = i=1 i(1   i). (Again 
from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, which is meant to capture the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals from a given village will not belong to the same sub-caste). Large land owner refers to a household 
with more than 5 acres of land, and educated refers to at least primary school. The Gini measures for land and 
income are computed using data from our Household Level Survey.
Distance to a natural water source, main road, and railways comes from the village amenities and GPS data 
from the 2001 Census of India. The soil quality index comes from the FAO-UNESCO soil maps. Rainfall information 
comes from the India Meterological Department. The nal four variables are the four main regions of Maharashtra 
where we collected our data
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Table A4 - Pradhan Positions - Unreserved Villages - Castes with Reservations
Whole Sample: Excluding Maratha Pradhan Villages:
Jati Proportion ProbabilityWin Observations Probability Win Observations
0 to 25% 0.02 942 0.03 465
0 to 20% 0.01 916 0.03 453
0 to 15% 0.01 886 0.03 441
25% to 50% 0.29 45 0.38 34
20% to 50% 0.21 71 0.33 46
25% to 45% 0.29 41 0.39 31
20% to 45% 0.21 67 0.32 43
15% to 50% 0.15 101 0.28 58
25% to 60% 0.36 55 0.49 41
50% to 100% 0.65 20 0.81 16
45% to 100% 0.58 24 0.74 19
60% to 100% 0.60 10 0.67 9
70% to 100% 0.60 5 0.75 4
80% to 100% 0.50 2 0.50 2
Notes: Observations are at the jati level. The sample excludes Marathas.
Table A5 - Public Goods in Caste Neighbourhood - Low Castes
Variable SHAREJATIk
Public goods in caste neighbourhood:
Drinking water problems -0.08 (0.03)***
Electricity problems -0.04 (0.02)**
Percent of households with electricity 6.3 (2.2)***
Per capita drinking wells 0.04 (0.01)***
Perceptions of Gram Pradhan:
Honest 0.08 (0.04)**
Provides public goods 0.08 (0.04)**
Does not discriminate by caste -0.20 (0.06)***
Caters to my caste 0.09 (0.05)**
Caters to my caste neighbourhood 0.08 (0.05)*
Observations 5008
Notes: The sample excludes Maratha households. Regression disturbance terms are clustered at the village 
level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimations include GP, geographic, demographic, climatic, 
regional, and household controls. A single asterix denotes signicance at the 10% level, double for 5% , and triple 
for 1%,
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Table A6 - Estimations of Governance Measures - Interacted Categories
Variable
RESERV EDk
(Jati Pradhan < 25%)
RESERV EDk
(25%  Jati Pradhan  50%)
RESERV EDk
(Jati Pradhan > 50%)
GP Measures
All programs 0.23 (0.33) 1.70 (0.54)*** -0.17 (0.64)
BPL programs 0.08 (0.11) 0.63 (0.19)*** -0.02 (0.22)
Income programs 0.17 (0.30) 1.51 (0.49)*** -0.22 (0.59)
Employment Guarantee Scheme -0.01 (0.03) 0.10 (0.05)** 0.02 (0.06)
Revenue/capita 0.77 (49.7) 294.1 (79.1)*** -35.6 (86.8)
Funds/capita 8.05 (26.5) 148.4 (42.2)*** -11.1 (46.3)
Expenses/capita 21.5 (48.5) 227.8 (77.2)*** 4.2 (84.7)
Observations 320 320 320
Household Measures
All programs 0.28 (0.33) 1.56 (0.42)*** -0.24 (0.73)
BPL programs 0.09 (0.12) 0.58 (0.15)*** -0.05 (0.25)
Employment Guarantee Scheme -0.01 (0.04) 0.08 (0.04)** -0.02 (0.06)
Program participation 0.17 (0.11) 0.47 (0.15)*** -0.01 (0.23)
Needy get benets 0.40 (0.29) 1.51 (0.43)*** -0.01 (0.71)
Received what entitled to 0.24 (0.15) 0.71 (0.22)*** 0.11 (0.34)
Observations 6859 6859 6859
Notes: The top panel of the table reports estimation results using the GP level data. These estimations include
geographic, demographic, climatic, and also regional controls. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Refer
to Table A1 in the Appendix for more information on the variables in these estimations. The bottom panel of
the table reports estimation results using the household level data. In these estimations, regression disturbance
terms are clustered at the village level and robust standard errors are in parentheses. These estimations include
geographic, demographic, climatic, regional, and household controls. Refer to Table A2 in the Appendix for more
inforation on the variables in these estimations. A single asterix denotes signicance at the 10% level, double for
5%, and triple for 1%.
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Table A7 - Estimations on Villages with 25%  Jati Pradhan  50% - Interaction Eects
Variable RESERV EDk RESERV EDk ML1k RESERV EDk RESERV EDk ML2k
GP Measures
All programs -0.19 (0.79) 2.48 (0.75)** 0.01 (0.77) 1.67 (0.79)**
BPL programs 0.21 (0.23) 0.63 (0.32)** 0.16 (0.27) 0.43 (0.27)y
Income programs -0.18 (0.75) 2.27 (0.99)** -0.10 (0.69) 1.67 (0.72)**
Employment Guarantee Scheme 0.01 (0.14) 0.16 (0.16) 0.02 (0.08) 0.11 (0.09)
Revenue/capita 34.1 (112.1) 344.1 (167.1)** -48.9 (152.4) 343.8 (222.5)y
Funds/capita 21.7 (52.4) 155.6 (84.6)* -12.4 (69.8) 169.8 (108.7)y
Expenses/capita 8.4 (107.2) 328.7 (173.8)* 4.2 (187.1) 263.7 (244.2)
Observations 65 65 65 65
Household Measures
All programs -0.51 (1.03) 2.85 (1.11)*** 0.12 (0.74) 1.60 (0.78)**
BPL programs 0.07 (0.36) 0.74 (0.35)** 0.22 (0.25) 0.34 (0.27)
Employment Guarantee Scheme -0.04 (0.19) 0.15 (0.19) 0.03 (0.18) 0.07 (0.10)*
Program participation -0.22 (0.43) 0.91 (0.44)** 0.01 (0.27) 0.48 (0.24)*
Needy get benets -0.67 (0.92) 2.56 (0.99)*** -0.08 (0.65) 1.41 (0.71)**
Received what entitled to -0.41 (0.59) 1.31 (0.58)** 0.01 (0.40) 0.59 (0.42)
Observations 1869 1869 1869 1869
Notes: The top panel of the table reports estimation results using the GP level data. These estimations include
geographic, demographic, climatic, and also regional controls. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Refer
to Table A1 in the Appendix for more information on the variables in these estimations. The bottom panel of
the table reports estimation results using the household level data. In these estimations, regression disturbance
terms are clustered at the village level and robust standard errors are in parentheses. These estimations include
geographic, demographic, climatic, regional, and household controls. Refer to Table A2 in the Appendix for more
inforation on the variables in these estimations. A single asterix denotes signicance at the 10% level, double for
5%, and triple for 1%. y denotes statistical signicance at the 12% level.
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Figure 1 – Government Finances – Kernel Density Plots 
Figure 2 – Government Programs (Village Data) – Kernel Density Plots 
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Figure 3 – Government Programs (Household Data) – Kernel Density Plots 
Figure 4 – Pradhan Quality – Estimated Coefficient Plots 
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Figure 5 – Governance Outcomes and Pradhan Jati  – Estimated Coefficient Plots 
Figure 6 – Governance Revenue – Placebo Tests  – Estimated Coefficient Plots 
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Figure 7 – Governance Programs – Placebo Tests  – Estimated Coefficient Plots
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Figure A1 – Government Finances – OBC Reservations  – Estimated Coefficient Plots 
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Figure A2 – Government Programs – OBC Reservations  – Estimated Coefficient Plots 
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